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ABSTRACT
This study is an examination of the roll call voting 
behaviors of members of the House of Representatives toward 
family policy legislation during the years 1979 to 1994.
The two objectives of this study are (a) to determine 
whether a family policy domain exists among the legislation 
considered by the House during each of the sessions examined 
in this study, and (b) to explain and predict the voting 
behavior of House members toward family policy legislation.
After a review of the theories of legislative voting 
behavior, the literature on legislative voting behavior, and 
relevant family science literature, an empirical model was 
developed and tested to explain the voting behavior of the 
members of the House of Representatives on family policy 
legislation. Information concerning the personal and 
district characteristics was collected for each House 
member. The variables included are (a) party affiliation,
(b) political ideology, (c) proportion of the member's 
district living in an urban area, (d) that are blue collar 
workers, (e) in the military, (f) that have women in the 
labor force, (g) that is living in a household with children 
under age eighteen, (h) that is composed of married couples,
vi
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(i) that has as the head of the household a female, (j) that 
is black, (k) that is Hispanic, and (1) median age of 
residents.
The results of the principal components analysis 
revealed a single factor that explained the majority of the 
variance within each session of the House examined, 
indicating that a family policy domain exists in the 
legislation considered by the House. Several regression 
analyses were conducted to explain and predict the voting 
behavior of House members. The results of these analyses 
suggest that the political ideology of a legislator is the 
most powerful and consistent predictor of the family policy 
roll call voting behavior. The remaining personal 
characteristic and district characteristics had some effect 
on voting behavior, but these variables were not as stable 
as political ideology.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
The roll call votes of lawmakers at the state and 
federal level have been used to address many scholarly 
questions. At the federal level, roll call votes of the 
United States Senate have been used to examine Supreme Court 
nominations (Segal, Cameron, & Cover, 1992) and 
confirmations (Overby, Walsh, & Strauss, 1992). At the 
state level, roll call votes have been used to identify the 
factors or characteristics that influence the voting 
behaviors of state legislators (Garand & Monroe, 1995) .
Political scientists have offered several theories to 
explain the voting behaviors of legislators (Collie, 1984; 
Kingdon, 1977; Matthews & Stimson, 1978; Weisburg, 1978) . 
Different types of spatial theories of roll call voting 
behavior have been proposed by researchers to predict 
different types of roll call votes of legislators (Clausen, 
1973; Poole & Daniels, 1985; Poole & Rosenthal, 1991, 1997; 
Wilcox Sc Clausen, 1991) . Wilcox and Clausen (1991) suggest 
legislative voting is a result of a multidimensional model, 
that means multiple factors influence legislators' voting 
decisions on different policy issues. Poole and Rosenthal 
(1991, 1997) , on the other hand, argue for the use of a 
unidimensional model because only one factor, the political
1
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ideology of a legislator, is needed to predict the votes of 
legislators.
Other researchers have suggested additional factors 
that may influence legislative decisions (Collie, 1984; 
Kingdon, 1977; Matthews & Stimson, 1978; Weisburg, 1978).
In an attempt to explain decision making in specific policy 
domains, researchers have tested different empirical models. 
Models have been developed for policy areas such as defense, 
education, welfare, and tax issues (Lindsay, 1990; Monroe, 
Garand, & Teeters, 1995; Overby, Henschen, Strauss, & Walsh, 
1992; Segal et al., 1992; Wink, Livingston, & Garand, 1996).
These sophisticated empirical models have established 
that certain factors or characteristics of legislators can 
be used to explain or predict the passage of certain laws or 
policies. Although political scientists have been studying 
roll call voting behavior for several decades, there is no 
consensus about which characteristics and factors are the 
most influential or predictive across the broad range of 
laws and policies.
The concerns and interests of political scientists 
studying legislators' voting behaviors are not necessarily 
the same as those of family scientists. Political 
scientists have developed complex theories and statistical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
models to explain legislators' voting behavior concerning 
many policy domains. While family scientists are interested 
in similar objectives, such as determining a theory or model 
to explain voting behavior concerning family policy 
legislation, family scientists must first answer the 
question of whether there is a family policy domain.
Within the legislation considered by Congress there are 
clearly identifiable policy domains. Tax legislation, 
education legislation, and defense spending legislation are 
each indisputably a defined body of legislation about which 
legislators have preconceived opinions before they ever know 
the substance of the bill. It is important to determine if 
family policy legislation is also an identifiable policy 
domain like these others. Without having a clearly defined 
area of family policy, there is no pattern of voting 
behavior to examine.
The voting behaviors of legislators should not just be 
of interest to political scientists. It is also very useful 
for family scientists and family policy advocates. In the 
past, political scientists have used the outcomes of roll 
call votes to predict the voting behavior of legislators on 
a variety of political issues based on certain factors and 
characteristics of the legislator. For family scientists,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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determining the voting behaviors of legislators on family 
policy issues could be very useful and important, 
particularly for family advocacy groups, lobbyists, and 
educators. Suggestions could then be made as to which 
factors influence a legislator's vote on family policy 
legislation. Family and child advocates would be wise to 
use this information to make informed decisions about which 
legislators to target to support family and child policies.
Purpose of Research 
It is the purpose of this research to, first, determine 
whether or not there is a family policy domain within the 
legislation considered by the United States Congress; and 
second, to develop and test an empirical model that explains 
the voting behavior of the members of the House of 
Representatives on family policy legislation. By predicting 
the outcome of each House member's vote, a determination of 
the accuracy of the model can be assessed. Data have been 
collected from the terms of the House of Representatives 
during the years 1979 through 1994. Each piece of 
legislation used in the analysis will be examined based on 
its potential consequence to the family. This model will 
attempt to predict outcomes of votes on legislation 
concerning the family. This research could have powerful
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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implications for advocates, political parties, and interest 
groups in determining factors critical in the decision 
making or voting behavior of Congress on such legislation in 
the future.
Justification 
Throughout history, the American family has proven 
itself to be a self-reliant, functioning part of society.
For the most part, families were responsible for educating, 
socializing, and preparing children for their future roles 
as contributing members of society. In more recent history, 
there has been a shift away from the private domain of the 
family to a more public one. The responsibilities and 
functions served by the family in the past have been taken 
over by other public institutions in society such as, 
churches, schools, and governmental agencies.
When examining the shift in responsibilities formerly 
associated with the family, it is reasonable to look at the 
various reasons for the changes. Primarily, legislative 
behavior has directly affected the family. Government 
agencies and various societal institutions, established with 
such legislation, have resulted in changes in family 
behaviors and functioning. It would be difficult to study 
the modern American family without examining the role and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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influence that government, legislation, and bureaucracies 
have had on the family.
Past studies have examined the voting behavior of the 
U.S. Congress toward family policies. One study examined 
Senate voting behaviors on family and medical leave 
legislation (Monroe & Garand, 1991). The Monroe and Garand 
(1991) study examined the personal characteristics of the 
Senator and the contextual demand variables which would send 
signals to the Senator from his/her constituency on which 
way to vote on this piece of legislation. Personal 
characteristics such as party identification were found to 
be the most significant factors in predicting the vote on 
the legislation. A study by Tiller (1994) examined the 
voting behavior of the U.S. House of Representatives on 
family policy legislation during a single term of Congress. 
Tiller's study expanded Monroe and Garand's (1991) study by 
increasing the number of policies and roll call votes which 
were analyzed. Another important aspect of Tiller's study 
was to define exactly what a family is and what a family 
policy is.
Following the defining of family policy, Tiller 
examined legislation considered by the House of 
Representatives during a single term to determine if there
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
was a domain of public policies that could be considered 
family policy. Tiller found strong evidence that a family 
policy domain indeed existed during the Congressional 
session examined.
Although these studies introduced family scientists to 
the research into legislative voting behavior, each study 
was limited in scope. In the first study, Monroe and Garand 
(1991) examined one roll call vote by the Senate. In the 
second study, Tiller (1994) examined all of the roll call 
votes during a single session of the House of 
Representatives. These two studies were important because 
each created a foundation for a larger more comprehensive 
study. If one examines the voting behaviors of legislators 
only on a short term basis, a complete explanation of voting 
behavior cannot be determined. These past studies were both 
short term, which can be viewed as a weakness because the 
conclusions of each study were certainly limited.
The factor of time has been established as a critical 
part of studying voting behavior. Weisburg (1978) suggests 
legislative voting should be viewed as longitudinal, dynamic 
and incremental. The process of legislators' voting 
behaviors cannot be adequately determined by short term 
models like those of Monroe and Garand (1991) and Tiller
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(1994), but rather a long-term study is necessary to 
substantiate the findings in these earlier studies.
The present study will expand the examination of the 
voting behavior of the House of Representatives by 
increasing the number of House sessions analyzed and 
subsequently the number of roll call votes included in the 
analysis. The expanded nature of this study will allow for 
a more definitive and more comprehensive examination of the 
legislation being considered by the House as well as the 
voting behavior of members of the House toward family policy 
legislation over time. The model included in this study 
will examine the votes of legislators over a period of time 
rather than as single events.
Political Nature of the Family 
It is common to hear politicians, media, or the public 
lament the current state of the family, which they attribute 
to too much government or the programs the government has 
created. The rhetoric is so great it is often impossible to 
discern specific criticism. People are disturbed by the 
idea of government; many times no particular policy or 
program is questioned. Similarly, it is often difficult to 
determine the specifics when politicians speak about how to 
fix the problems with the government. This is not to say
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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there are not legitimate problems to be concerned about, nor 
that there are not possible solutions to any of them. There 
is usually someone willing to blame the government or 
government programs for the current problems facing the 
nation.
Steiner (1981), in his book The Futility of Family 
Policy, outlines how the issue of the family has made its 
way into the rhetoric of politicians, popular media, and 
public opinions. Today it is almost certain that any person 
running for political office will mention his/her support 
for family issues. The importance of the family in 
political races is a relatively new occurrence. During the 
70's there were several developments that made the 'family' 
a political tool.
One of these developments was the publication of The 
Negro Family: The Case for National Action (1965) and 
Coping: Essays on the Practice of Government (1973) by 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan. These publications documented the 
problems and challenges facing families in the United 
States. At the time, these papers were considered 
provocative and insightful and led to a few earnest attempts 
to study the issues raised in Moynihan's work.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The sincere interest in the state of the American 
family led to organized thinktanks and committee efforts to 
investigate some of the claims being made. The genuine 
effort and attention of the government was viewed by the 
media and the public as the thoughtful actions of a 
compassionate and benevolent government. The positive 
response of the public to the idea of family issues gave way 
to this sentiment being echoed by politicians running for 
just about any office. The problem was that the politicians 
could now speak merely in general terms of the importance of 
family with no specifics of any policy or agenda being 
proposed to support their interest. Steiner says 
politicians could now simply point to investigations or 
studies being performed by the government as indicators of 
their sincere interest in family issues.
The question of sincerity in politicians' interest in 
family issues has gotten more difficult to answer since 
Steiner's book was published in 1981. The family was seen 
as one of the pivotal issues in the 1988 presidential race 
between Bush and Dukakis and again in the 1992 presidential 
race between Bush and Clinton.
In 1988, the conservatives cornered the market on 
support for the family. Bush was viewed during the campaign
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
as the candidate who would act as the champion for the 
American family and would promote policies that would 
support the family. People were soon asking which policies 
Bush would promote and which families these policies would 
support.
During the 1992 campaign, Clinton questioned 
conservatives who seemed to have a monopoly on support for 
the family, thus creating what appeared to be a strong 
domestic agenda to strengthen the American family. Though 
Clinton won the 1992 election, it is debatable which 
president's rhetoric of support and promotion of the family 
was better achieved.
Objective
The first objective of this research is to determine 
whether there is a family policy domain among the 
legislation considered by Congress during the years of this 
study. The second objective of this research is to analyze 
the voting behavior of Congress over time on family policy 
legislation. Analysis of this voting behavior will allow 
researchers to predict and explain voting on legislation 
relating to the family.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Hypothesis
There is no relationship between voting behavior of 
members of Congress toward family policies and the following 
factors:
a. Party affiliation of U.S. House member
b. Political ideology of U.S. House member
c. Proportion of U.S. House member's district living in
an urban area
d. Proportion of U.S. House member's district that
constitutes blue collar workers
e. Proportion of U.S. House member's district residents
in the Military
f. Proportion of women in the labor force in the U.S.
House member's district
g. Proportion of U.S. House member's district that is
living in a household with children under age 
eighteen
h. Proportion of households in U.S. House member's
district composed of married couples
i. Proportion of female headed households in the U.S.
House member's district 
j. Proportion of U.S. House member's district that is 
black
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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k. Proportion of U.S. House member's district that is 
Hispanic
1. Median age of person living in district of U.S.
House member
Limitations
The limitations of this study are:
1. Measures of some of the factors associated with 
voting behavior by members of Congress, as revealed in the 
research literature, were not available and therefore could 
not be collected.
2. Many policies directly related to the family occur 
at the state and local level, and are beyond the scope of 
this project.
Assumptions
The following statements are assumed to be true and 
fundamental to this research:
1. The family policies included in this study were a 
complete and exhaustive list of policies that directly 
related to the family considered by Congress during the time 
of this study.
2. The data collected and used for this study includes 
accurate measures of the variables and information about the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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members of Congress and their voting behavior as well as the 
other information collected.
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Family Policy
The idea of studying family policy is not a new one. 
Researchers for some time have been interested in 
legislation and its impact upon the family. Researchers 
have recognized that the United States lacks a national 
comprehensive family policy and that individual policies of 
the government at its different levels have direct and 
indirect consequences for the family (Kamerman & Kahn, 1978; 
Zimmerman, 1992).
Kamerman and Kahn in a 1978 book about family policy 
categorize policies that affect the family into two groups: 
explicit and implicit family policies. Explicit family 
policy refers to policies that are designed with an explicit 
goal or objective regarding the family. With explicit 
family policy, the family is clearly the object of the 
governmental action. The examples Kamerman and Kahn give of 
explicit family policy include family planning, day care, 
and child welfare. Implicit family policy refers to 
governmental action and policies not specifically planned to 
affect the family, even though the family still experiences 
indirect consequences of the policy. Examples of implicit
15
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family policy according to Kamerman and Kahn (1978) are road 
building, immigration policy, and trade and tariff policy.
Other researchers have expressed similar ideas about 
these categories of family policies. Gauthier (1996) 
defines family policy as measures which directly target 
families with dependent children. According to this 
definition, family policy would include legislation directly 
affecting the family. Gauthier suggests such policies would 
include direct or indirect cash transfers for families with 
children, services and benefits for families, as well as 
housing, education and health services and benefits for 
families with children.
Zimmerman (1992, 1995) uses the terms explicit and 
implicit family policy in relation to the goals and 
objectives of the policy, which is the same manner that 
Kamerman and Kahn (1978) use the terms. It is the purpose 
of the policy that defines whether it is explicit or 
implicit. Explicit family policies have as their purpose to 
affect families. According to Zimmerman (1995), explicit 
family policies have as their main purpose to enable 
families to remain together, to care for children while 
working out of the home, to care for elderly parents, or 
require parents to be financially responsible for children.
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Alternately, implicit family policies unintentionally affect 
the family. Any family objective in these policies would be 
difficult to identify. Some examples of implicit family 
policies cited by Zimmerman (1995) are health care reform, 
school finance reform, and zoning laws.
Tiller (1994), in her study Defining Family Policy: A
Roll Call Analysis, provides satisfactory definitions for 
explicit and implicit family policies. She defines explicit 
family policies as "those policies that provide support to 
families and enables them to carry out functional 
responsibilities of child care, child rearing, 
socialization, security -- providing home and health care, 
and providing monetary support for families unable to 
provide for themselves" (p. 41-42). She defines implicit 
family policies as "those policies that are not written 
explicitly for families, but for individuals, and which may 
have an impact on families as they carry out functional 
responsibilities" (p. 42). Some elements of explicit and 
implicit family policy which Tiller cites are similar to 
those expressed by other researchers in the field.
Theories of Legislative Voting 
There are two bodies of literature on legislative roll 
call voting research. According to Collie (1984), the first
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of these two areas of research is the analysis of collective 
voting. Collective voting is defined as the study of voting 
cleavages and alignments that exist among voting groups or 
legislatures. These cleavages and alignments generally form 
political parties or are evident in them. They are measured 
as party cohesion or party conflict.
While the body of literature on group voting or 
collective voting is important for understanding different 
aspects of legislative roll call voting, this project is not 
concerned with group voting, but rather individual roll call 
voting. Another area of research identified in the 
literature on legislative roll call voting is individual 
decision making. It is this second area of research that is 
relevant to this study.
Scholars have identified and outlined the major 
theories or models of individual legislative voting (e.g., 
Collie, 1984; Weisburg, 1978). These models can be used to 
explain individual voting behavior and to identify the 
determinants in the voting behavior. Three models: the 
consensus model, the cue taking model, and the policy - 
dimension model address the party and constituency factors 
that inpact upon individual voting behaviors. It is 
important in understanding these theories to identify the
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weaknesses, strengths, and general characteristics of each 
model because characteristics from the various theories of 
legislative roll call behavior will be useful in developing 
a model for this current study. Please note that the 
theories identified in this current study are referred to as 
models in the political science literature and therefore 
will be referred to as models in this study.
Consensus Model 
Kingdon's (1973) short-term model or consensus model of 
legislative decision making is based on decision rules used 
by the legislator. In this model, the legislator follows a 
very simple rule of asking if there is any controversy over 
the issue. If there is no substantial controversy, a 
consensus is assumed to exist and he/she votes with the 
group (Kingdon, 1977). Kingdon (1977) conducted interviews 
with Congressmen following votes cast on certain matters and 
based his model on the results. When Kingdon questioned the 
congressmen about whether they were even aware of certain 
information or if other factors had influenced their 
decision making, he concluded that the method of decision 
making was based on a consensus mode (Weisburg, 1978) . 
Kingdon believed the legislator is strictly interested in 
how much agreement or support exists for the issues.
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Kingdon points to "fields of forces" that may influence 
the legislator's vote in addition to his/her own policy 
attitude. These "fields of forces" are fellow congressmen, 
party leadership, legislator's staff, constituency, 
administration, and interest groups (Kingdon, 1977).
Kingdon found that congressmen rely on a cue from fellow 
congressmen. Kingdon suggests the second most important 
influence on a legislator's vote is his or her 
constituency's opinion.
Kingdon's model is successful in explaining the short­
term factors associated with individual roll call voting. 
However, Kingdon's emphasis on the short-term is one 
weakness of his theory. Weisburg (1978) stresses the 
importance of history in legislative voting as legislators 
constantly confront the same issues. While the legislator 
does not have to vote in the same way as he/she voted in the 
past, past decisions would most certainly influence his/her 
decisions in the future. There is the suggestion in roll 
call literature that a level of continuity exists within the 
legislator's voting behaviors because the legislators tend 
to vote in the same way over time (Weisburg, 1978) .
Weisburg (1978) suggests that researchers take past votes
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into account when constructing a model of voting behavior to 
create a voting history for each legislator.
Cue Taking Model 
A second theory identified in the literature is the cue 
taking model by Matthews and Stimson (1970). In this model, 
Matthews and Stimson suggest that since legislators make 
such a large number of votes with limited resources upon 
which to make their decisions, the legislators must look to 
certain cues to determine their votes. Matthews and Stimson 
have identified nine actors from which legislators are 
likely to seek and to receive cues concerning upcoming 
votes. These nine actors or cues are: (a) voting with the
state party delegation, (b) voting with the Conservative 
Coalition, (c) voting with the party leadership, (d) voting 
with the president, (e) voting with the committee chairman, 
(f) voting with the ranking minority members, (g) voting 
with the party majority, (h) voting with the House majority, 
and (i) voting with the Democratic study group (Collie,
1984; Weisburg, 1978).
According to the cue taking model, legislators create 
hierarchies of cue-givers. The legislator assigns a 
designation of influence or importance of actor's cues.
Cues range from those of most importance to those of least
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importance. These hierarchies differ with each legislator 
but remain stable across time and issue area.
When empirically tested, Matthews and Stimpson's (1970) 
model demonstrates high levels of predictive success. The 
model predicted votes across all subject domains with 88% 
success. Another strength of this model is its attempt to 
explain not just the vote but the voting process. Weisburg 
(1978) is critical of the Matthews and Stimpson (1970) 
theory because of the operationalization of the theory; 
however, Weisburg admits that with other operationalization 
even stronger support for the theory is possible.
The Policy Dimension Model 
The third theory of legislative voting is the policy 
dimension model by Clausen (1973). In this model, 
legislators classify votes based on their content to reduce 
the time and energy involved in making the decision 
(Clausen, 1973; Collie, 1984). Clausen (1973) describes the 
process involved when a legislator makes a voting decision. 
The legislator sorts specific policy proposals into limited 
numbers of general policy content categories. By 
establishing a policy position for each general category of 
policy content, a decision can be made on each vote assigned 
to that category. Legislators deliberately put votes into
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different policy dimensions (Wilcox & Clausen, 1991). On 
each policy dimension, the legislator develops a position 
reflecting the different political forces with different 
combinations of factors determine the legislator's position 
on different policy dimensions (Wilcox & Clausen, 1991) .
When a vote is needed, the legislator relates it to the 
broad policy area or dimension. His vote is dependent on 
the combination of various actors and factors he has 
determined to be critical to this policy dimension (Collie, 
1984; Wilcox St Clausen, 1991) . Consequently, different 
actors are influential in different policy areas (Collie, 
1984).
Clausen's policy dimension model includes a long-term 
element of the voting behavior. However, Weisburg (1978) is 
critical of Clausen's (1978) model even with the long-term 
component included in the theory. He argues that the long­
term component does not suffice as an explanation of voting 
behavior because the model lacks the process by which the 
member locates the motion on the policy dimension.
Each of the theories outlined is plausible. While the 
model of Matthews and Stimson claims the greatest empirical 
support of the models described, Kingdon and Clausen provide 
a compelling explanation of voting behavior. There are
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aspects of each of these theories that are important for the 
purposes of this study. Kingdon's theory suggests that the 
legislator's constituency is an important factor in 
subsequent voting decisions, Matthews and Stimson's theory 
offers insight on the importance of examining legislators 
voting behavior over time, and Clausen's policy dimension 
model describes voting in different policy domains. These 
elements drawn out of each theory served as the basis for 
the development of the model of roll call voting behavior 
towards family policy legislation that is used in the 
present study.
Spatial Models of Legislative Voting 
The research in the area of legislative voting behavior 
has evolved to include a variety of factors and influences 
to explain voting behavior. Collie (1984) describes the 
history of legislative voting. Initially, it was argued by 
researchers, that individual roll call voting was based on 
constituency influence alone. Others argued that 
constituency pressure and political parties factored 
together to influence voting behavior. Eventually, the idea 
was advanced that there were other influences that had an 
impact on individual roll call voting behavior. The
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legislator's own attitudes and perceptions played a role in 
his or her decisions.
Some contemporary researchers continue to argue spatial 
models are best at explaining legislative voting. Spatial 
models describe the dimensions that create the structure of 
roll call voting (Poole & Rosenthal, 1997). Some scientists 
believe that only one factor is truly significant in 
influencing individual roll call voting. Poole and 
Rosenthal (1991, 1997) argue that a legislator's ideology is 
the single most important factor or dimension in predicting 
and explaining a yes or no vote for almost any legislation. 
They posit that roll call voting is unidimensional, and that 
all roll call voting is structured along a dimension of 
1iberal/conservat ive ideology.
In empirical tests of the suggested unidimensional 
spatial model, Poole and Daniels (1985) use data based on 
roll call votes and interest group ratings collected from 
1959 to 1980. Eighty-one percent of the variance in the 
roll call voting behavior was explained with one dimension. 
The first dimension was a liberal-conservative continuum.
The liberal-conservative continuum, which was created by 
Poole and Daniels, was a continuum of ideology based on 
scores given to each Congress member from interest group
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ratings. The second dimension added only 6.1% explanatory 
power to the model of congressional voting, and the third 
dimension added 1.4% to the explained variance. Poole 
(1988) argued that personal beliefs, reelection interests, 
and other issues may combine to influence a legislator in 
the subsequent dimensions but not in an important or 
significant way; therefore, disentangling the factors in 
subsequent dimensions would only prove to be useless and 
futile. Poole (1988) concludes that the 
liberal/conservative dimension is the only dimension of 
value in roll call voting.
In a second empirical test of the unidimensional model, 
Poole and Rosenthal (1997) use all of the roll call votes 
cast in the House of Representatives and the Senate from 
1789 until 1985. Poole and Rosenthal examine various issues 
over time such as economic policies and race policies for 
both chambers of Congress. The results of this study 
duplicate those of the first study. A primary dimension 
dominates roll call voting throughout congressional roll 
call voting history, the ideological dimension.
Other researchers disagree with Poole's suggestion that 
there is a single dimension at work in legislative voting 
behavior (Clausen, 1973; Wilcox & Clausen, 1991). Wilcox
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and Clausen (1991) argue there are multiple policy 
dimensions that are involved with roll call voting. Clausen 
considers the notion that there is an unidimensional 
structure to roll call voting to be a gross simplification 
of decision making. Using an unidimensional model to 
explain roll call voting misses the subtle differences in 
voting due to policy areas (Wilcox & Clausen, 1991).
According to Clausen's policy dimension theory, a 
legislator develops a position reflecting the different 
political forces for the different dimensions. Different 
combinations of factors determine the legislator's position 
on different policy dimensions. Alignments, according to 
this theory, vary from policy area to policy area.
Wilcox and Clausen (1991) question the statistical 
technique used in Poole's analyses of unidimensional models. 
In using the unfolding analysis on nonunanimous roll call 
votes, the first dimension is used to account for as much 
variance as it can by assigning maximum shared variance to 
the first dimension. This technique overstates the 
usefulness of the first dimension and distorts the meaning 
of additional dimensions. Wilcox and Clausen (1991) argue 
that there are several advantages to using multidimensional 
models for analyzing voting behavior. First, the
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multidimensional approach allows for substantively 
interpretable policy dimensions. Second, this approach 
allows new policy dimensions to emerge and old dimensions to 
converge. Third, this approach allows for an examination of 
several policy positions held by members at the same time; 
therefore, a more thorough analysis of the ideology of 
voting members can be accomplished.
Clausen's multidimensional model of legislative voting 
has also been tested. He sorted roll call votes into five 
policy domains: economic policy, social welfare, civil 
rights and liberties, agriculture, and foreign and defense 
policy. The results established that there is a more 
complex dimensional structure to roll call voting than the 
unidimensional models reveal, although the
liberal/conservative dimension largely explained the social 
welfare policies and the government management policies of 
some of the other domains. However, the dimension did not 
account for the other domains.
The most important argument for using the policy 
dimension approach in the present study of voting behavior 
is that Clausen's policy dimension approach can be used to 
identify and explain changes in voting over time as well as 
the emergence of new policy domains. The first objective of
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this study is to identify a policy domain, a family policy 
domain, among the legislation considered by Congress over 
time. Another objective of this project is to explain 
voting behaviors of legislators toward family policy over 
time.
Tiller's (1994) study of family policy voting behavior 
also used Clausen's policy dimension approach. Tiller 
(1994) discovered a family policy domain existed within the 
legislation considered by Congress during one session. In 
the present study, a family policy domain is believed to 
exist within the legislation considered by Congress for the 
years 1979 to 1994.
Voting Behavior 
According to Poole (1988) the beliefs of a legislator 
are represented by the two political parties present in 
American politics. The ideologies represented by the 
parties explain the majority of the variance on any vote on 
any piece of legislation. In fact the political party is 
such a strong indicator of a legislator's vote, Weisburg 
(1978) suggests researchers use legislator's party 
affiliation as a baseline for gauging success of a model to 
predict legislator's voting behavior. According to 
Weisburg, all other factors tested in a model are examined
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for any improvements made over the predictive success of the 
political party variable.
A model used to predict a vote outcome using only 
political ideology will yield, on average, an explanation of 
85% of the votes (Weisburg, 1978). With such a large amount 
of the variation explained by just one factor, one may 
question the importance of further study of roll call voting 
behavior. Weisburg (1978) emphatically supports studies of 
roll call voting because there remains 15% of congressional 
voting still unexplained by this very basic model. Fifteen 
percent of the vote is a significant portion of the voting 
decision that would go unexplained without further 
investigation.
Other factors have been established in explaining part 
of the voting behavior, none, however as powerfully as 
political ideology and political party. Other variables can 
only explain some of the variance in voting behavior that 
has not already been explained by political party. Studies 
of voting behavior have been conducted covering different 
types of policies at different levels of government 
(Lindsay, 1990; Monroe & Garand, 1991; Monroe et al., 1995; 
Overby et al., 1992; Segal et al., 1992; Tiller, 1994; Wink, 
Livingston, & Garand, 1996) . Models of voting behavior are
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very different depending upon the types of policies and the 
level of government that is being examined. For example, 
some research may examine the legislative rules and internal 
organizations of the law making body, while others may 
simply examine the preferences and characteristics of the 
legislator (Panning, 1983).
Family Policy Legislation Voting Behavior 
While political scientists have been studying the 
voting behavior of legislators and policy makers for some 
time in many policy areas, it is only recently that 
scientists have examined voting behavior for family policy 
legislation. Previous research studies have developed a 
model for predicting voting behavior toward family policies 
in the U.S. Congress (Monroe & Garand, 1993; Monroe et al., 
1995; Monroe, Tiller, & Garand, 1997; Tiller, 1994). In the 
first study, Monroe and Garand (1991) developed a model for 
predicting voting behavior in the United States Senate 
toward parental leave legislation. It was predicted that 
Senate voting would be a function of two sets of variables: 
personal characteristic variables, such as partisan 
identification and policy liberalism, and contextual demand 
variables, which reflect demands for parental leave 
legislation from Senators' constituencies. This study
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yielded results a little different from what the authors 
expected. The contextual demand variables had a very 
limited impact on the voting behavior of the Senate and not 
the significant impact that was expected. The Senate voting 
behavior was a function of certain personal characteristic 
variables.
In another study Tiller (1994) expanded on the work of 
Monroe and Garand's earlier roll call vote analysis. Tiller 
analyzed the roll call votes on family policy legislation 
during a term of Congress, which is two years, thus 
expanding the scope of the study from one Senate vote to two 
years of votes in the House of Representatives. Tiller's 
study lent support to the idea that there is a policy domain 
of family policy legislation. Tiller's (1994) analysis also 
identified variables that were likely to have an impact upon 
individual House members' voting behavior on family policy 
legislation. Tiller found the conservative or liberal 
ideology of House members and support for the President1s 
position on legislation were significant factors in 
predicting House members' voting behaviors for the one 
session of Congress analyzed.
A study by Monroe et al. (1995) tested a model of 
parental leave legislation at the state legislative level.
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This study of state adoption of parental leave legislation 
along with Monroe and Garand's study of Senate adoption of 
parental leave legislation further established the study of 
family policy at the state and federal level. All of the 
studies of family policy voting behavior have created a 
foundation for additional, more comprehensive studies of 
family policy voting behaviors.
The previous research in family policy legislation 
introduced models of family policy voting behaviors. These 
studies also empirically confirmed that a family policy 
domain exists among the legislation examined.
Unfortunately, these studies were limited in the number of 
policies studied as well as the length of time legislators' 
votes were collected, and a very important part of studying 
legislative voting behavior is the element of time. In 
studies of voting behavior, patterns of voting emerge over 
time that would be missed with short-term studies. Weisburg 
(1978) describes an important part of understanding 
legislative voting behavior is by examining the behavior 
over time. In order to appropriately study the process by 
which legislators make their decisions, a long-term model of 
legislative voting is required.
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The studies of family policy voting behaviors of the 
past have been limited due to the short term nature of the 
studies. Monroe and Garand's (1993) study of parental leave 
modeled the voting behavior of U.S. Senate on one family 
policy during one term of Congress. Tiller's study of 
family policy modeled voting behavior of the U.S. House of 
Representatives for one term of Congress. The present study 
addresses the limitations of these past studies of family 
policy voting behaviors by examining voting behaviors of the 
U.S. House of Representatives over 16 years. The present 
study includes data collected from 1979 until 1994.
Beginning in 1979 information was more uniformly reported 
for many of the variables of interest in this study. Prior 
to 1979, many pertinent pieces of information were not 
available or were reported differently making it difficult 
to examine any years prior to 1979.
Modeling Family Policy Legislation Roll Call Voting 
In Monroe and Garand's (1991) study two types of 
variables were identified and included in their model of 
voting on family leave legislation: personal characteristic
variables and contextual demand variables. This study will 
also use these two sets of variables.
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Personal Characteristics
The political party of a member of Congress has been 
established as an important indicator of individual voting 
behavior (Poole & Rosenthal, 1991; Weisburg, 1978) . Monroe 
and Garand (1991) point out that political parties generally 
develop different positions on policy issues. A member of 
one political party is more likely to vote with fellow 
members of that party than with members of the other party. 
The political party or party affiliation of each member of 
Congress will be included as an independent variable in this 
analysis.
The ideology continuum is generally represented by the 
two political parties. Democrats generally take the liberal 
positions and Republicans the more conservative one (Monroe 
& Garand, 1991). While political parties represent 
ideological positions, members may deviate from their party 
positions on issues and vote with an ideology. Monroe and 
Garand point to the case of Southern Democrats as an example 
of members who do not always vote with their parties. 
Southern Democrats often vote in a more ideologically 
conservative way than do other Democrats.
One indicator of political ideology is included in this 
study. The indicator is Poole and Rosenthal's political
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ideology dimension (1997) . Each legislator is given an 
ideological score based on an examination of every vote cast 
by the legislator. The higher the calculated score the more 
conservative the voting behavior.
District Characteristics 
Legislators do not make voting decisions in a vacuum. 
Alternatively, legislators must consider the demands of 
their constituencies. A district with specific concerns 
should have a legislator who is responsive to these concerns 
and votes accordingly. Monroe and Garand (1991) argue that 
"there are aspects of each legislator's political 
environment that create a predisposition for the member to 
either support or oppose a given piece of legislation" (p. 
210) .
This model contains several demographic contextual 
variables supported by past family policy roll call 
analyses. The first of these variables is urbanization of 
district. According to Monroe and Garand (1991), people 
from areas with high levels of urbanization should be more 
comfortable with answers from the government for public 
problems. Congressman from districts with high levels of 
urbanization should be more likely to support new
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legislation, and in the case of this study the new 
legislation would be family policy legislation.
Organized labor is generally supportive of social 
policies and those policies meant to protect workers 
(Tiller, 1994) . Family policies in this study can be viewed 
as social policy and therefore it can be reasonably expected 
that organized labor would be supportive of these policies. 
The proportion of members in a district that were in a union 
has been included in previous family policy roll call 
analysis studies (Monroe & Garand, 1991; Monroe et al.,
1995; Tiller, 1994), but these data were not available for 
the present study. The proportion of district that is blue 
collar workers was included to approximate the union 
membership. Higher levels of blue collar workers in a 
district should reflect a more supportive attitude towards 
family policy legislation. The higher levels of blue collar 
workers in a district should be represented by a legislator 
more likely to support family policy legislation.
The level of residents in a district that are in the 
military is also expected to be related to support for 
family policy legislation. People in the military depend 
upon government legislation for their livelihood. When the 
government shuts down military bases, members of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
military, their family, and the community are directly 
affected. In this study, it is expected that legislators 
from districts with a high number of residents in the 
military will be supportive of family policy legislation.
Legislators from districts with a large number of women 
in the labor force are also expected to support family 
policy legislation. Much of the new family policy 
legislation is directly related to the issues and concerns 
of women in the labor force and their needs for child care 
and work place policies. Monroe, Garand, and Teeters (1995) 
argue that states with higher numbers of women in the work 
place will be more likely to support family policy 
legislation. In this study, a variable measuring the 
percent of women in the labor force from each district is 
included. It is predicted that legislators will be more 
likely to support family policy legislation when there are 
high levels of female labor force participation in the 
district.
Family household composition has been included in past 
studies of family policy legislation (Monroe et al. , 1995; 
Tiller, 1994). Monroe et al. (1995) argue that households 
with children, families, and married couples would be more 
likely to support family legislation. In the current study,
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there are three measures of family household composition. 
This study includes a measure of married couples in a 
household, households with children under eighteen, and 
female headed households. It is predicted that the 
districts with a high proportion of households composed of 
these three types of families will tend to be more 
supportive of family policy legislation.
Racial composition of districts has been demonstrated 
to have a positive and significant inpact on family policy 
legislation (Monroe et al., 1995; Tiller, 1994). Monroe et 
al. (1995) argue that ethnic minorities tend to be
supportive of government programs and policies. In their 
study, legislators from districts with higher Hispanic 
constituencies were more likely to support family and 
medical leave legislation. In this study, there are 
measures of black and Hispanic proportions in each 
congressional district. It is predicted that legislators 
from districts with higher levels of black and Hispanic 
constituencies will be more supportive of family policy 
legislation.
Monroe et al. (1995) and Tiller (1994) included a 
measure of age in their models of family policy legislation. 
They argue that younger aged constituents would be more
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more likely to be starting families or already have young 
children in the home. These young families would be more 
likely to support family policy legislation. A measure of 
the median age in the district was collected as well as a 
proportion of the district that is elderly.
After an examination of the past studies of family 
policy roll call voting behavior, important concepts and 
variables were recognized. Characteristics of legislators 
and their districts appropriate for this study were 
identified. After a review of the theories of legislative 
models, the literature of legislative voting behavior, and 
relevant family science literature, a model of roll call 
voting behavior was developed for this study.
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The first objective of this study is to determine 
whether a family policy domain exists among the legislation 
considered by the House during the years of this study. The 
second objective of this study is to build a predictive and 
explanatory model of U.S. House members' voting behaviors 
toward family policy legislation. In past research, Tiller 
(1994) tested a model to predict the voting behavior of 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives for family 
policy legislation for one session of Congress. The present 
study is an expansion of the model used by Tiller to test 
the voting behavior of U.S. House members for family policy 
legislation during eight sessions of the House for the years 
1979 until 1994. The model used in the present study will 
allow a comprehensive examination of the factors that 
explain U.S. House members' votes on family policy 
legislation over time.
The methodology in the study is complex and contains 
multiple steps. A brief overview of these steps is given 
below, with details following. The first step in this study 
is to define family policy and to identify a body of family 
policy legislation that can be analyzed. To develop a body 
of family policy legislation, two separate investigators
41
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examined all of the legislation considered by the House 
during the years of the study and each investigator 
identified the legislation she considered to be family 
policy legislation. A third independent investigator 
selected the final pool of family policy legislation from 
the legislation presented by the first two investigators.
The second step in the analysis is a principal 
components analysis (PCA) to identify whether a family 
policy domain exists during each of the eight sessions of 
the House examined. The PCA also creates a family policy 
liberalism variable which is to be used in an analysis 
conducted later.
The final steps include three methods for analyzing the 
roll call votes of House members to determine the possible 
relationships between the personal and district 
characteristics and legislators' family policy roll call 
voting behavior. The three methods of analysis are an OLS 
regression analysis of family policy liberalism, a logistic 
regression analysis of each family policy vote, and a 
logistic regression analysis of all of the family policy 
votes over all of the years of the study. Using the results 
of the three separate analyses conducted on the family 
policy votes, an assessment can be made of how well each
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variable in the model predicts and explains the voting 
behaviors of House members.
Data Collected 
Data were collected for each of the variables in the 
model of roll call voting behavior. Variables were included 
in this model after a review of the theories of legislative 
voting behavior, the literature on legislative voting 
behavior, and relevant family science literature. The roll 
call votes of members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
were collected for the years 1979 to 1994 to account for the 
dependent variable in this analysis. Each motion considered 
by the U.S. Congress is published in the Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac. In this publication, a listing of all 
members of Congress is presented with a description of each 
motion, and each House member's vote on the motion. Each 
member's roll call vote on each bill selected for study was 
collected for this analysis.
Data were collected for the other variables included in 
the model, including personal characteristics of the 
representative and characteristics of the district he/she 
represents in Congress. Data were collected from the 
Almanac of American Politics for district information on the 
following variables:
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proportion of district living in urban area 
proportion of residents that are blue collar workers 
proportion of district residents in the military 
proportion of women in labor force 
proportion of households with children under 18 
proportion of district composed of married couples 
proportion of households headed by a female 
proportion of district residents that are black 
proportion of district residents that are Hispanic 
median age of district residents.
Unfortunately, data were not available for certain district 
characteristics for every year of this study. Data for the 
proportion of district residents composed of married 
couples, households with children under eighteen, women in 
the labor force, female headed households, and proportion of 
district that is Hispanic were not available for the years 
1979 through 1982. Some statistical analysis had to be 
conducted without these pieces of data. Data were available 
for all other variables, personal characteristics and 
district characteristics, for all of the years of the study. 
(See Table 1 for full description of variables included in 
this study.)
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Table 1
Description of Variables Used in Model of House Roll call 
Voting on Family Policy Legislation
Variable Description
Family Policy Vote 1 = House member voted yes on family
policy legislation;
0 = House member voted no on family 
policy legislation
Party [-] 1 = Republican House member; 
0 = Democratic House member
Political 
Ideology [-]
Poole and Rosenthal's Scale of Political 
Ideology, scaled in the conservative 
position




Proportion of district that is blue 
collar worker




Proportion of district with females 
in the labor force
Households with 
Children [+]




Proportion of district households 
composed of married couples
Female Headed 
Households [+]




Proportion of district that is black
(table continues)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
Variable Description
Hispanic Proportion of district that is Hispanic
Population [+]
Median Age [-] Median age in district
Note. The svmbols in brackets indicate the exoected
direction of the relationship between each variable and
support for family policy legislation.
Information about each U.S. House member was collected 
from Vital Statistics on American Politics. The personal 
information includes each member's party affiliation. The 
political ideology of each legislator was collected from 
Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) D-NOMINATE data set. In this 
data set, roll call votes were collected for each member of 
Congress from 1789 until 1995. A political conservatism 
ideology score was calculated for every House member based 
on all of his or her roll call votes during each session.
Ultimately, the dependent variable of interest in this 
study is the outcome of the voting on each piece of selected 
legislation, operationalized as the roll call votes for each 
bill. The possible vote outcomes are a 'yea' vote or a 
'nay' vote; abstentions and absences are excluded from the 
analysis. Since there are two possible outcomes for the
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dependent variable, the variable is a dichotomous variable. 
Logistic regression is an appropriate statistic to be used 
in this analysis because of the dichotomous dependent 
variable in this study (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984) .
In any given session of Congress, a few members do not 
serve the complete two years of their term. Some members 
die or retire during the two years and therefore fail to 
complete their term in office. When a member of Congress 
does not complete his/her term in office the member is not 
present to vote on all legislation during that session. The 
proposed analysis is not possible for members of Congress 
who were not able to vote on the legislation because they 
were out of office. Thus only the votes of members who were 
eligible to vote on all motions considered during a given 
session are included in this analysis.
Selecting Roll Call Votes 
As determined from the literature presented earlier, 
family policy is defined as "those policies that provide 
support to families and enable them to carry out 
responsibilities of child care, child rearing, 
socialization, security and providing monetary support."
With this criterion in mind, an initial investigator 
examined all of the motions considered by the U.S. House of
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Representatives from 1979 until 1994. Every bill judged to 
pertain to family policy was identified. Given the 
political nature of the family, it is important to report 
the political views of the investigators who selected the 
family policy legislation. The first investigator had a 
self-reported conservative political view of family issues. 
The first investigator selected 449 family policy votes for 
consideration in this project.
Using the same criteria, a second investigator also 
screened all of the motions considered by the U.S. House of 
Representatives from 1979 until 1994 and identified every 
motion she determined pertained to family policy. The 
second investigator had a self-reported liberal political 
view of family issues. The second investigator selected 
only 215 family policy votes for consideration for this 
proj ect.
There was a large discrepancy in the number of votes 
collected by the first and second investigator. The first 
investigator collected budget votes and job creation votes 
as family policy votes and the second investigator culled 
these votes. This decision accounted for most of the 
discrepancy in the large number of votes collected by the 
first versus the second investigator.
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In the next round in the selection of family policy 
legislation, a third investigator was used to make the final 
decision as to which motions would be included in the study. 
The third investigator used some decision rules regarding 
the selection of policies for this analysis in addition to 
the criterion used by the first two investigators.
Categories of policies were identified that would be 
eliminated from consideration for this study. The 
categories eliminated were family planning or abortion bills 
except when minors are involved; budget votes or allocation 
of monies to departments; Housing, Urban and Community 
Development bills except if specifically targeted to 
families or child care facilities; education bills and 
activities concerned with schools; job creation bills; and 
unemployment benefits bills. It was decided that although 
bills in these categories have implications for the family 
and some of these bills may in fact affect families, these 
bills were considered explicitly part of other policy 
domains that are outside the scope of this project.
The third investigator examined all of the family 
policies selected by the first and second investigators and 
determined which bills met all of the criteria for inclusion
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in the study. The third investigator also had a self- 
reported liberal view of family issues.
The third investigator chose a total of 154 family 
policy votes from the total set of motions presented by the 
first and second investigators. Thus the selections by the 
third investigator created the final group of family policy 
votes to be used in this study. One hundred twenty-one of 
the first investigator's family policy votes were selected 
by the third investigator, and 111 of the second 
investigator's family policy votes were selected by the 
third investigator. Ninety-three of the final 154 family 
policy votes chosen by the third investigator were selected 
by both the first and the second investigator.
One hundred fifty-four votes met the criteria for 
inclusion in the present study. However, 45 bills could not 
be included in the analysis because the votes were unanimous 
or nearly unanimous leaving no variation in the variable to 
be examined. One hundred nine family policy votes remained 
in the study. Appendix A includes a description of each 
policy and the outcome of each of the family policy votes.
Family Policy Domain 
The first objective of this study is to determine 
whether a family policy domain exists within the legislation
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considered by the House during the eight sessions examined 
in the present study. A principal components analysis (PCA) 
was chosen to determine whether there is a family policy 
domain among the legislation considered by the House during 
each of the eight sessions of the House examined. PCA is a 
statistical tool that is used to identify concepts that are 
not directly observable, but rather are underlying concepts 
(Hanneman, 1995-1996). PCA can be used when there is some 
variance in the variable of interest. PCA yields cohesive 
factors that explain the underlying concept the data share 
in common. The results of Tiller's (1994) roll call 
analysis of one session of the House indicated that a family 
policy domain existed among the legislation considered. 
Tiller's findings lend credibility to the expectation that 
the votes analyzed in the present study will coalesce in a 
similar way within each session of the House.
In order to use PCA the data must be coded in a semi- 
continuous form (Burrill, 1995) . The data were coded 1 for 
the yea votes, -1 for the nay votes, and 0 for absences or 
missing votes. This coding of the family policies allowed 
for the family policies in the study to be analyzed using 
PCA.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
PCA was conducted on all of the roll call votes within 
each session of Congress which earlier had met the criteria 
to be included in this study. The analysis allows the 
researcher to identify whether a family policy domain 
emerges within the legislation identified in each session of 
the House.
The Dimensionality of Roll Call Voting 
Many discussions of family policy legislation yield 
debates over whether policies are actually pro-family or 
anti-family. Many people debate whether a particular family 
policy is positive or beneficial for the family, while 
others can make an equally compelling argument that the same 
family policy will have a negative or detrimental effect on 
the family. As discussed earlier, the family can be a very 
political issue in the United States today. The present 
study refrains from such debates about whether a particular 
family policy is pro- or anti- family by labeling each 
policy as either a liberal or conservative family policy 
using the results of PCA. By identifying each policy as a 
liberal or conservative family policy, the benefits or 
detrimental effects of a policy for the family would not be 
a relevant discussion for this study.
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PCA can be used to verify a liberal-conservative 
dimension that exists in the family policy legislation. The 
question is whether House members' votes coalesce at the 
liberal end or the conservative end of the ideology 
continuum for each policy included in the present study.
PCA has been used in previous studies (Monroe et al., 1997; 
Tiller, 1994) to identify the 'yea* position of each roll 
call vote as the liberal position or the conservative 
position. A positive factor score indicates the 'yea' vote 
is a liberal position, while a negative factor score 
indicates a 'yea' vote is the conservative position (see 
Appendix C). PCA can be used to calculate a roll call 
voting score measured in the liberal direction for each 
member based on the number of liberal or conservative votes 
cast on the family policy legislation. The score created by 
PCA is called a family policy liberalism score and is used 
in another part of the analysis.
OLS Regression of Family Policy Liberalism 
The family policy liberalism score calculated for each 
U.S. House member as explained in the previous section is 
used as the dependent variable in an OLS regression 
analysis. The family policy liberalism score is each 
member's composite score based on each member's support
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towards family policy legislation. In an OLS regression 
model, the district and personal characteristics of each 
legislator are used to predict the family policy liberalism 
score of the House members for each session included in the 
present study.
Logistic Regression Analysis of each Family Policy Vote 
The second objective of the present study is to predict 
and explain the voting behavior of legislators for each 
piece of family policy legislation selected for this study. 
In order to predict and explain roll call behaviors on a 
range of family policy votes, it is important to examine 
each piece of legislation and the U.S. House members' votes 
independently, rather than relying on the composite score 
for the dependent variable. Logistic regression analysis 
was used to predict the yea and nay votes of the U.S. House 
members for each family policy. An individual analysis of 
each policy examines which personal characteristics or 
district characteristics are the best predictors of House 
members' voting on family policy legislation.
Prediction of Family Policy Legislation Over Time 
The last step of the data analysis is to look at the 
voting behaviors of legislators toward family policy 
legislation over time. This step of the analysis requires a
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slightly different approach to the data. In the previous 
step of the data analysis, the individual family policy 
votes were treated as separate variables. In this final 
analysis, each family policy vote was treated as a separate 
case. The 'yea' and 'nay' votes cast by each legislator for 
all of the 109 family policy votes included in this study 
was the dependent variable of interest in this portion of 
the data analysis. Also, a dummy variable was included in 
this model for each of the 109 pieces of family policy votes 
to estimate the fixed effects in this model.
Examining the votes cast by legislators over eight 
sessions of Congress, allows a determination to be made of 
which variables predict and explain legislators' voting 
behaviors over time. All of the votes were recoded to the 
liberal position based on the results of the PCA. Again, a 
logistic regression analysis is the appropriate tool to 
analyze these data given that there is a dichotomous 
dependent variable (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984).
Conclusion
The data analysis in this study will allow a model of 
legislative voting behavior on family policy legislation to 
be tested. A determination will be made concerning whether 
a family policy domain exists among the legislation
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considered in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 
years 1979 until 1994. While past researchers have 
successfully modeled roll call voting on a few pieces of 
family policy legislation, the present study is a 
comprehensive examination of votes and factors related to 
the voting behaviors of members of the House of 
Representatives.
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RESULTS 
Introduction 
Statistical analyses were conducted on the data 
collected for the present study to determine whether a 
family policy domain exists and to predict and explain the 
roll call voting behaviors of U.S. House members over the 
years 1979 to 1994. The results of this research include a 
description of the data collected, the principal components 
analysis, an OLS regression analysis of family policy 
liberalism score, a logistic regression analysis for each of 
the family policy roll call votes, and a report of two of 
these family policy votes as case studies.
The descriptive statistics of variables in this 
analysis are presented in Appendix B. Variance inflation 
factors were used to test for multicolinearity within 
independent variables included in this current study and no 
multicolinearity was detected. An alpha level of .05 was 
used as the standard for significance to be reached in the 
analyses. In some cases, variables achieving significance 
under a relaxed standard of significance (p < .10) will be 
discussed, but will be clearly differentiated from those 
achieving a conventional standard of significance.
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Family Policy Legislation 
There were several different types of bills that were 
included in the final group of family policy votes examined 
in the present study. Looking over the text of the bills, 
the majority of the family policy votes address parental and 
medical leave for families; food, education and health 
programs for disadvantaged children; and general welfare 
policies. Other categories of family policy votes included 
in the study were domestic violence, discrimination against 
families and pregnant women, child care, elderly programs, 
and domestic partnership bills. All of the family policy 
votes used in this study met the criteria specified in the 
definition of family policy. In each of these family 
policies, support is being offered to families to help take 
care of children or other family members. The number of 
family policy roll call votes that were selected for each 
session is presented in Table 2.
The number of family policy votes considered by the 
House differed during each session of the House included in 
this study. Except for two sessions, the number of family 
policy votes considered by the House appears stable during 
each of the sessions considered. There were minor increases
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Table 2
The Number of Family Policy Votes Selected by Session










Total Number of 
Family Policy Votes Selected 109
and decreases in the number of bills considered between 
sessions of the House that could be easily explained with 
natural changes in the policy priorities that occur with 
each new session of Congress.
There are two sessions that appear to be outliers. In 
the session during years 1981 to 1982, only two bills were 
selected from all of the legislation considered by the House 
for these two years. This number is by far the lowest 
number of family policy votes selected during any of the 
sessions. One explanation for the small number of family 
policy votes is that this session of Congress coincided with 
Ronald Reagan's first years in office. It is well known 
that Reagan had a very conservative agenda concerning 
defense and domestic spending. Reagan's agenda could have
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dictated the legislation considered by Congress during these 
years, which would have excluded much attention being given 
to family policy votes.
The second outlier is the number of family policy votes 
selected during the session that occurred during 1993 to 
1994. During this session of the House 26 family policy 
votes were selected. This number was the highest number 
selected during the years of this study. This session of 
Congress also coincided with the first two years of a 
president's administration. When Bill Clinton came to 
office in 1993, it was well known he had a far-ranging 
domestic agenda for Congress. Clinton was also a strong 
supporter of the Family and Medical Leave Act, and passage 
of this bill was considered a major priority during his 
administration. During 1993 alone, Clinton's first year in 
office, the House of Representatives considered 13 Family 
and Medical Leave motions.
The number of family policy votes considered during the 
years of this study suggests that the Presidential agenda 
has an effect on the Congressional agenda. There was one 
session of Congress with a noticeably small number of family 
policy votes considered by the House and another session of 
Congress with a noticeably large number of family policy
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votes considered by the House. The discrepancy in the 
number of family policy votes considered during these two 
sessions of the House corresponds directly with the first 
years of two presidents from different political parties 
with very different political priorities. These results 
alert us to the possibility that the Presidential agenda has 
an influence on family policy legislation.
Description of House Members 
Data were collected for all the members of the United 
States House of Representatives in each of the eight 
sessions of Congress examined in the present study. Members 
who did not complete their terms due to death or retirement 
were excluded from the analysis. The number of members 
excluded varied slightly by each session of Congress. Table 
3 lists the number of members who were included and excluded 
from the study by session and years.
Principal Components Analysis 
Principal components analysis (PCA) was used to 
determine whether a family policy domain exists among the 
legislation considered by the House during the years of this 
study. In order to determine if a family policy domain 
exists, a separate PCA analysis was conducted for each 
session of the House. It was expected that a PCA would
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Table 3
Members of House of Representatives Included and Excluded in 






96th 1979-1980 430 5
97th 1981-1982 434 1
98th 1983-1984 425 10
99th 1985-1986 432 3
100th 1987-1988 424 11
101st 1989-1990 429 6
102nd 1991-1992 427 8
103rd 1993-1994 429 6
yield a single factor that identifies a family policy 
domain.
For each of the eight sessions, a single factor emerged 
that explained 46.7% to 77.4% of the variance. Eigenvalues 
for these factors that emerged for each session ranged from 
1.55 to 14.07. The results of the principal components 
analysis support the contention that a family policy domain 
exists in the legislation considered by Congress during each 
of the eight sessions that were examined. The percent of 
variance explained combined with the high eigenvalues 
indicate the existence of a family policy domain among the 
legislation examined.
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One unexpected finding occurred in the legislation 
during the 103rd Session for years 1993 to 1994. It was 
assumed by the researcher that the House would consider more 
liberal family policy legislation than conservative family 
policy legislation. The factor scores would then represent 
liberal voting behaviors. This assumption proved faulty for 
the 103rd session of the House. There was more legislation 
considered by the House that was supported by conservatives 
than there was legislation that was supported by liberals. 
There was actually more conservative family policy 
legislation voted on than liberal legislation; therefore, a 
negative factor score indicates a liberal family policy 
while a positive factor score indicates a conservative 
family policy for just this one session. The factor 
loadings for each policy in each session of Congress are 
listed in Appendix C.
OLS Regression Analysis of Family Policy Liberalism 
Having established a family policy domain in the 
legislation considered in the House, the researcher 
calculated a family policy liberalism score for each of the 
U.S. House members included in this study. The family 
policy liberalism score represents the propensity of each of 
the members to vote 'yea' on family policy legislation. A
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regression analysis was conducted using the family policy 
liberalism score during each session of the House as the 
dependent variable in the model. Results of the OLS 
regression analysis for each session of the House are 
presented in Tables 4 through 11. It is important to note 
that the directions of the hypothesized relationships are 
opposite for the 103rd Congress. During this session of 
Congress, the majority of legislation considered was 
conservative. Because of the large number of conservative 
family policy votes, the factor scores for the legislators 
of the 103rd Congress represent legislators' conservative 
family policy voting behavior instead of liberal family 
policy voting behavior.
Personal Characteristics 
In the current study, political party and political 
ideology were highly predictive of legislators' family 
policy liberalism voting behavior. Political party 
predicted legislators' family policy liberalism voting 
behavior in each of the eight sessions in the expected 
direction. However, political party was a significant 
predictor in all but one of the eight sessions. For the 
sessions in which political party was significant,
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Table 4
OLS Estimates for Model of House Roll Call Liberalism on
Family Policy Votes, 96th Congress, 1979-1980
(15 bills)




Political Party - .239 - 4.064*** .000
Political Ideology -2.939 -27.755*** .000
District Characteristics
Urban .001 2 .258** .025
Blue Collar .003 1.160 .247
Military .000 .025 .980
Black - .005 - 3.286*** .001
Median Age .005 .727 .467
Intercept - .396 - 1.234 .218
*** pc.Ol ** p<.05 * p<.10
R2 = .847
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Table 5
OLS Estimates for Model of House Roll Call Liberalism on
Family Policy Votes, 97th Congress, 1981-1982
(2 bills)




Political Party - .283 - 2.936*** .004
Political Ideology -2.423 -14.205*** .000
District Characteristics
Urban - .002 - 1.870* .062
Blue Collar .000 .087 .931
Military .001 .142 .887
Black - .001 - .445 .657
Median Age - .021 - 1.992** .047
Intercept 1.123 2 .278** .023
*** pc.Ol ** p<.05 * p<.10
R2 = .633
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Table 6
OLS Estimates for Model of House Roll Call Liberalism on
Family Policy Votes, 98th Congress, 1983-1984
(14 bills)




Political Party - .214 - 2.804*** .005
Political Ideology -2.887 -21.571*** .000
District Characteristics
Urban - .003 - 2.020** .044
Blue Collar .005 1.401 .162
Military - .005 .474 .636
Women in the Labor Force - .008 - 1.355 .176
Households with Kids under 18 .004 .449 .654
Married Couples .001 .588 .557
Female Headed Households - .020 - 1.502 .134
Black .001 .503 .615
Hispanic - .003 .403 .687
Median Age .001 .649 .517
Intercept .135 .119 .905
*** pc.Ol ** p<.05 * p<.10
R2 = .808
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Table 7
OLS Estimates for Model of House Roll Call Liberalism on
Family Policy Votes, 99th Congress, 1985-1986
(9 bills)




Political Party - .176 - 2.477** .014
Political Ideology -2.785 -23 .742*** .000
District Characteristics
Urban - .006 - 3.718*** .000
Blue Collar .005 1.249 .213
Military .006 .551 .582
Women in the Labor Force .006 1.075 .283
Households with Kids under 18 - .006 - .658 .571
Married Couples .001 .342 .733
Female Headed Households - .014 - 1.081 .280
Black .000 .163 .870
Hispanic - .001 .321 .748
Median Age .005 .264 .792
Intercept .294 .268 .789
*** pc.Ol ** p<.05 * p<.10
R2 = .826
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Table 8
OLS Estimates for Model of House Roll Call Liberalism on
Family Policy Votes, 100th Congress, 1987-1988
(13 bills)




Political Party - .529 - 8.798*** .000
Political Ideology -2.101 -22.147*** .000
District Characteristics
Urban - . 001 - 1.532 .595
Blue Collar - .001 - .352 .725
Military - .015 - 1.825* .069
Women in the Labor Force .003 .605 .545
Households with Kids under 18 .005 .635 .526
Married Couples .002 1.000 .318
Female Headed Households .006 .594 .553
Black - .001 - .230 .818
Hispanic .004 2.060** .040
Median Age .016 1.224 .222
Intercept - .466 - .566 .578
*** p<.01 ** p<.05 * pc.10
R2 = .897
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Table 9
OLS Estimates for Model of House Roll Call Liberalism on
Family Policy Votes, 101st Congress, 1989-1990
(12 bills)




Political Party - .352 - 4.907*** .000
Political Ideology -1.770 -17.645*** .000
District Characteristics
Urban .004 2.519** .012
Blue Collar .009 2.517** .012
Military .006 .572 .567
Women in the Labor Force - .002 .415 .678
Households with Kids under 18 . 019 2.056** .040
Married Couples .002 1.070 .285
Female Headed Households - .005 .379 .705
Black - . 004 - 1.598 .111
Hispanic - .001 .537 .592
Median Age .042 2.633*** .009
Intercept -2.935 - 2.907** .004
*** p<. 01 ** p<.05 * pc.10
R2 = .845
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Table 10
OLS Estimates for Model of 











Political Party - .234 - 2.888*** .003
Political Ideology -1.819 -20.596*** .000
District Characteristics
Urban - .000 - .065 .915
Blue Collar .003 . 973 .370
Military .000 .001 .878
Women in the Labor Force .002 .498 .540
Households with Kids under 18 .016 1.915** .035
Married Couples .002 1.141 .299
Female Headed Households - .012 - 1.183 .403
Black - .001 - .646 .355
Hispanic .002 1.116 .300
Median Age .049 3 .359*** .000
Intercept -3.054 - 3.013*** .003
*** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10
R2 = .852
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Table 11
OLS Estimates for Model of House Roll Call Liberalism on
Family Policy Votes, 103rd Congress, 1993-1994
(26 bills)




Political Party .090 1.502 .134
Political Ideology 1.936 27.304*** .000
District Characteristics
Urban - .003 - 2.792*** .005
Blue Collar .004 1.601 .110
Military .001 .092 .926
Women in the Labor Force - .007 - 1.759* .079
Households with Kids under 18 .018 1.808* .071
Married Couples - .019 - 2.384** .018
Female Headed Households - .020 - 2.165** .031
Black .009 3.673*** .000
Hispanic .001 .532 .595
Median Age .001 .136 .892
Intercept 1.472 2.314** .021
*** pc.Ol ** p<.05 * p<.10
R2 = .883
Note. The direction of the hypothesized relationships are
opposite for this, the 103rd Congress.
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Republican members were less likely to vote 'yea' for the 
family policy legislation.
Political ideology was highly predictive of 
legislators' family policy liberalism voting behavior in 
every session in the expected direction. Members with a 
liberal political ideology were more likely to vote 'yea' 
for the family policy legislation.
District Characteristics 
Proportion of district that is urban was significantly 
related to family policy liberalism voting behavior in six 
of the eight sessions of the House examined when it was 
expected to be significant in all eight of the sessions in 
which it was included. It was significantly related in the 
expected positive direction in only three of the six 
sessions in which it was significant. In the other three 
sessions in which it was significantly related to family 
policy liberalism voting behavior, it was in the unexpected 
negative direction. In the 97th session, an unexpected 
negative relation is found but only by allowing a relaxed 
standard of significance.
The negative relationship between family policy 
liberalism voting behavior and urbanization was a surprising 
finding. Persons from highly urban areas should be more
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likely to support new government legislation. Other 
researchers hypothesized that persons from these areas are 
more accustomed to asking the government to intervene and 
solve public problems. The mixed findings in this study 
indicate that the variable, districts with a high level of 
urbanization is not a stable predictor of family policy 
voting behavior and something other than urbanization 
predicts House members' family policy voting behavior.
Proportion of district whose residents are blue collar 
workers was significantly related to family policy voting 
behavior in only one of the sessions, the 101st session, of 
the House examined when it was expected to be significant in 
all of the sessions examined. Blue collar workers in this 
study was used as a proxy for labor union support which is 
highly related to support for social policies. It was 
expected that districts with a high proportion of blue 
collar workers would also be more supportive of new family 
policy legislation. Again, this finding suggests that labor 
union impacts, measured as the proportion of blue collar 
workers in district, is not a strong predictor of family 
policy voting behavior.
Proportion of district residents that are in the 
military was significant in only one session when it was
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expected to be significant in every session. In the 100th 
session a significant negative relationship is found only by 
allowing a relaxed standard of significance. This finding 
was surprising because it was expected that legislators from 
districts with a high proportion of residents who are in the 
military would support family policy legislation. Members 
of the military work for the government and depend upon 
legislation to keep bases open and benefits continuing. It 
was hypothesized that legislators representing these 
constituents would also support family policy legislation. 
These results indicate that proportion of district that is 
in the military is not a good predictor of family policy 
liberalism voting behavior.
Proportion of district with women in the labor force 
was significantly related to family policy liberalism voting 
during only one of the six sessions, and then only under a 
relaxed standard for significance. It was expected that 
this variable would be significant in all six of the 
sessions for which it was available. Proportion of district 
with women in the labor force was significantly related to 
family policy liberalism voting in the expected positive 
direction for the 103rd Congress. It was hypothesized that 
the greater the number of women in the labor force in a
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district the more supportive the legislator would be toward 
family policy legislation. These results suggest that this 
variable is not a useful predictor of House members' family 
policy voting behaviors.
Proportion of households with children under 18 was 
significantly related to family policy liberalism voting 
during three of the six sessions of the House included in 
this study when it was expected that it would be significant 
in all six of the sessions. This variable was available for 
only six of the eight sessions of the House. The proportion 
of households with children under 18 was positively related 
to family policy liberalism voting in two sessions, which 
was the expected direction. In the other session, the 103rd 
session, proportion of households with children under 18 was 
significantly related to family policy liberalism voting 
behavior in the unexpected direction and then the variable 
only reached significance under a relaxed standard of 
significance. It was expected that having more constituency 
households with children under 18 would be significantly 
related to family policy liberalism voting behaviors. These 
findings suggest that proportion of households with children 
under 18 was not a strong predictor of House members' family 
policy voting behaviors.
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Proportion of households composed of married couples 
was significantly related to family policy liberalism voting 
behaviors during only one of the six sessions of the House 
when it was expected to be significant in all six sessions. 
This variable was available for only six of the eight 
sessions of the House included in this study. Proportion of 
households composed of married couples was highly 
significant and in the expected direction for the 103rd 
Congress.
Proportion of households that are headed by a female 
was significantly related to family policy liberalism voting 
behaviors in only one of the six sessions of the House. It 
was expected to be significant in all six sessions for which 
it was available and collected. Proportion of households 
that are headed by a female was highly significant and in 
the expected direction for the 103rd Congress.
Proportion of district that is black was significantly 
related to family policy liberalism voting behaviors in two 
of the eight sessions of the House although it was expected 
to be significant in all eight of the sessions. In two 
sessions of the House, the 96ch and the 103rd, proportion of 
district that is black was negatively related to family 
policy liberalism voting behavior, which was in the
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unexpected direction. It was hypothesized that legislators 
from districts with a high proportion of black residents 
would support family policy legislation.
Proportion of district that is Hispanic was predictive 
of family policy liberalism voting behaviors during one of 
the six sessions of the House although it was expected to be 
significant in all six sessions. This variable was 
available and collected for six of the eight sessions of the 
House included in this study. The proportion of district 
that is Hispanic was negatively related to family policy 
liberalism voting behavior in the lOO1̂  session, which was 
the unexpected direction of this relationship. It was 
hypothesized that legislators from districts with a high 
proportion of Hispanic residents would be more likely to 
support family policy legislation.
Median age in district was predictive of family policy 
liberalism voting behaviors for two of the eight sessions of 
the House although it was expected to be significant in all 
eight sessions. Median age was positively related to family 
policy liberalism voting behavior, which was contrary to 
what was expected, in both the 101st and 102nd sessions of 
Congress. Median age was hypothesized to have a negative 
relationship with family policy liberalism because these
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family policies were more likely to affect younger 
constituents.
In sum, the personal characteristics of the legislators 
were excellent predictors of family policy liberalism voting 
behaviors during all of the sessions of the House examined. 
Some legislative district characteristics were stronger 
predictors of family policy liberalism voting behaviors than 
others, although none of these characteristics were 
consistently significant for all of the eight sessions of 
the House that were examined. The district characteristics 
of legislators do not appear to be strong predictors of 
family policy liberalism voting behaviors unlike the 
personal characteristics, which were consistently 
significant in each of the sessions of the House included in 
this study.
Analysis of Individual Roll Call Votes
Separate logistic regression analyses were estimated 
for each roll call vote. The results are summarized below; 
tables may be found in Appendix D. The model is highly 
effective in predicting the House members' family policy 
votes, which is the dependent variable in the analysis.
The model predicted over 90% of the roll call votes 
accurately for 63 of the 109 family policy votes. The model
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predicted over 80% of the roll call votes accurately for 
another 40 family policy votes, and only six family policy 
votes had less than 80% of the votes predicted accurately by 
the model. The percent of roll call votes predicted 
accurately for each session is listed in Table 12.
Table 12
Percent of Roll Call Votes Predicted Accurately for Each 
Session
Range of Votes Predicted Accurately 
Session Years__________ Lowest____Highest________ Mean
96th 1979-1980 
(15 family policy votes)
72.83 94.90 87.53
97th 1981-1982 
(2 family policy votes)
87.60 92.35 89.98
98th 1983-1984 
(14 family policy votes)
77.47 98.90 90.96
99th 1985-1986 
(9 family policy votes)
81.82 95. 10 91.75
100th 1987-1988 
(13 family policy votes)
77.72 98 . 99 87.38
101st 1989-1990 
(12 family policy votes)
83 .17 98.74 91.38
102nd 1991-1992 
(18 family policy votes)
80.97 97.51 90.11
103rd 1993-1994 
(26 family policy votes)
64.89 98.82 89.69
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Personal Characteristics 
The results of individual roll call analyses indicate 
that certain variables consistently predict and explain 
family roll call voting behavior. The variable that is most 
highly predictive is the personal characteristic, political 
ideology. In 107 of 109 (98%) roll call votes analyzed, 
political ideology was a significant predictor of House 
members' family policy voting behavior. For each of these 
107 family policy votes, political ideology was significant 
in the expected direction. The political ideology of the 
legislator was negatively related to a 4yea' vote for the 
family policy, indicating that House members with a 
conservative political ideology were less supportive of 
family policies.
The other personal characteristic, political party, was 
also a good predictive variable in this model. Political 
party was significantly related to the legislator's family 
policy voting behavior in 53 of the 109 (48%) family policy 
votes. However, in eight of these family policy votes, 
significance is achieved only by allowing a relaxed standard 
of significance. In 42 of the 53 family policy votes, 
political party was significantly related to legislator's 
voting behavior but in the unexpected direction. It was
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hypothesized that Republicans would be less supportive of 
family policies or that a Republican party affiliation would 
be negatively related to family policy voting behavior, but 
contrary findings emerged.
District Characteristics 
Of the district characteristics, proportion of district 
that is urban was predictive of House members' family policy 
voting behavior in 29 of the 109 (27%) family policy votes; 
in 11 of these family policy votes significance is achieved 
only after allowing a relaxed standard of significance. In 
14 of these 29 family policy votes, proportion of district 
that is urban was significantly related to House members' 
voting behavior in the unexpected direction.
Proportion of district that is blue collar workers was 
predictive of House members' voting behavior in 14 of the 
109 (13%) family policy votes. However, in six of these 
family policy votes significance was achieved only by 
allowing a relaxed standard of significance. In 8 of these 
14 family policy votes, proportion of district that is blue 
collar worker was significantly related to House members' 
voting behavior in the unexpected direction.
Proportion of district that is in the military was 
predictive of House members' voting behavior in 17 of the
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109 (16%) family policy votes. However, in seven of these 
family policy votes significance was achieved only by 
allowing a relaxed standard of significance. In 7 of these 
17 family policy votes, proportion of district that is in 
the military was significantly related to voting behavior in 
the unexpected direction.
Proportion of district that has women in the labor 
force were highly predictive of House members' voting 
behavior in 14 of the 96 (15%) family policy votes.
However, in six of these family policy votes significance 
was achieved only by allowing a relaxed standard of 
significance. In 6 of these 14 family policy votes, 
proportion of district that has women in the labor force was 
significantly related to House members' voting behavior in 
the unexpected direction. As previously discussed, data for 
proportion of district that has women in the labor force was 
not available for all of the years of the study; therefore, 
this variable only appeared in 96 of the 109 family policy 
votes analyzed.
Proportion of district with households with children 
under 18 was significantly related to House members' voting 
behavior in 16 of the 96 (17%) family policy votes for which 
data were available. However, in eight of these family
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policy votes significance was achieved only after allowing a 
relaxed standard of significance. In 7 of these 16 family 
policy votes, proportion of district with households with 
children under 18 was significantly related in the 
unexpected direction.
Proportion of households composed of married couples 
was significantly related to House members' voting behaviors 
in 9 of the 96 (9%) family policy votes for which data were 
available. However, in five of these family policy votes 
significance was achieved only after allowing a relaxed 
standard of significance. In 4 of these 9 family policy 
votes, proportion of households composed of married couples 
was significant in the unexpected direction. These results 
suggest that this variable is not a useful predictor of 
House members' family policy voting behaviors.
Proportion of district that is female headed households 
was significantly related to House members' voting behavior 
in 18 of the 96 (19%) family policy votes for which data 
were available. However in three of these family policy 
votes significance was achieved only after allowing a 
relaxed standard of significance. In 4 of the 18 family 
policy votes, proportion of district that is female headed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
households was significant in the unexpected negative 
direction.
Proportion of residents in district that are black was 
predictive of House members' voting behavior in 26 of the 
109 (24%) family policy votes. However, in eight of these 
family policy votes, significance is achieved only after 
allowing a relaxed standard of significance. In 16 of the 
26 family policy votes in which proportion of district whose 
members are black was significant, the variable was related 
to family policy voting behavior in the unexpected 
direction. It was hypothesized that districts with higher 
levels of black constituents would have legislators that 
were more supportive of family policy legislation. However, 
the majority of family policy votes that were significant, 
were in the unexpected negative direction. This finding 
suggests that House members with high levels of black 
constituents are actually less likely to support family 
policies.
Proportion of residents in district that are Hispanic 
was highly predictive of House members' family policy voting 
behavior in 17 of the 96 (18%) family policy votes.
However, in nine of these family policy votes significance 
was achieved only after allowing a relaxed standard of
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significance. In 6 of these 17 family policy votes, 
proportion of district that is Hispanic was negatively 
related to support for family policies, which was the 
unexpected direction.
Median age of district residents was predictive of 
House members' family policy voting behavior in 23 of the 
109 (24%) family policy votes. However, in 10 of these 
family policy votes significance was achieved only after 
allowing a relaxed standard of significance. In 19 of these 
23 family policy votes, median age in district was 
positively related to support for family policies, which was 
the unexpected direction.
One-hundred-nine individual roll call votes were 
analyzed and the results are presented in Appendix D.
Instead of describing each of the 109 votes, two family 
policy votes were chosen and are reported as case studies. 
The case study approach will allow the two family policy 
votes to be examined in detail. The discussion will focus 
on the two logistic regression analyses so that the effects 
of personal characteristics and the district characteristics 
can be explored.
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Family and Medical Leave (HR 1)
The first case study is an examination of the final 
passage in 1993 of the Family and Medical Leave Act, which 
had been voted on in various forms over several years.
Family and Medical Leave was designed to provide job 
security for family members who need to be on leave with a 
new child or sick family member. The bill requires 
employers of more than 50 employees to provide 12 weeks of 
unpaid leave for an illness or to care for a new child or 
sick family members. This policy is an excellent example of 
a family policy. The objective of this policy is to provide 
support to families in order to care for other family 
members, which fits the definition of family policy used in 
this study.
The Family and Medical Leave Act was adopted 265 to 
163, with Republicans voting 40 for the policy and 134 
against, Democrats voting 224 for the policy and 29 against, 
and Independents voting 1 for the policy and 0 against. A 
'yea' vote for the Family and Medical Leave Act was 
considered a liberal policy position and a nay vote for the 
Family and Medical Leave Act was considered a conservative 
policy position.
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A model of House members' voting on Family and Medical 
Leave was tested empirically with a logistic regression 
model. Logistic regression is an appropriate statistical 
tool when the dependent variable is dichotomous (Aldrich & 
Nelson, 1984) . In this model the dependent variable was 
dichotomous: 1 = vote for the policy and 0 = vote against 
the policy. With logistic regression, a prediction is made 
of the outcome of the dependent variable, in this case the 
vote outcome, based on the values for each House member's 
personal and district characteristics.
The model successfully predicted 86% of the votes on 
the Family and Medical Leave Act. Of the votes that were 
eligible to be included in the analysis, there were 261 
'yea' votes and 161 'nay' votes on this family policy bill. 
The model accurately predicted the votes of 364 of the 422 
House members casting votes on this motion. Of the 261 
votes in support of the motion, 231 votes or 89% were 
predicted correctly. Of the 161 votes against the motion, 
83% of the votes were predicted correctly. It is also 
important to note that the model did as good a job 
predicting the 'yea' votes as the 'nay' votes, with 89% of 
the 'yea' votes predicted correctly compared with 83% of the
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'nay' votes predicted correctly. Table 13 contains the 
results for the logistic regression analysis.
The personal characteristic variables, political party 
and political ideology, were both significantly related to 
voting for the Family and Medical Leave Act, the former 
under a relaxed standard of significance. Political 
ideology was an excellent predictor of House members' 
support for this motion. As expected, conservative 
political ideology was negatively and highly significantly 
related to support for the Family and Medical Leave Act. 
Unexpectedly, party identification was positively and 
significantly related to support for this roll call vote. 
This family policy vote was a liberal family policy vote, so 
it is somewhat surprising that political party was 
significant in the positive direction. Democrats appeared 
to be more likely to support this policy, yet the results 
indicate that Republican party identification is positively 
related to support for this policy. It appears that much of 
what causes Republicans to vote in the expected negative 
direction is captured in the political ideology variable.
Only a few district characteristics were significantly 
related to votes on the Family and Medical Leave Act.
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Table 13
Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for the Roll Call 
Vote on the Family and Medical Leave Act (HR 1)
Variable b t prob.
Personal Characteristics
Political Party 1.037 1.852* .064
Political Ideology - 6.053 -7.086*** .000
District Characteristics
Urban .017 1.639 .101
Blue Collar - .015 - .772 .470
Military .062 .820 .412
Women in the Labor Force .060 1.494 .135
Households with Kids under 18 .055 .629 .529
Married Couple Households .020 .252 .801
Female Headed Households .236 2 .243** .025
Black - .095 -3.341*** .001
Hispanic - .008 - .470 .638
Median Age .102 1.684* .092
Intercept -13.693 -2.127** .033
*** pc.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10
Percentage of Votes Predicted Accurately = 86% 
Pseduo R2= .640
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Proportion of female headed households was positively (the 
expected direction) and significantly related to support for 
this legislation. It was hypothesized that legislators 
would consider the needs of their constituencies when 
casting votes on family policy legislation, and this Family 
and Medical Leave motion has implications for female headed 
households especially. In female headed households, there 
is generally only one financial provider and this 
legislation would protect the jobs of these women so they 
could take time off from their jobs to care for family 
members without fear that their jobs would be terminated.
Proportion of residents in district that are black was 
negatively and significantly related to support for this 
legislation; this was the unexpected direction. The higher 
the proportion of district that is black the less likely the 
legislator was to support this policy. It was hypothesized 
that high proportions of black residents would lead to 
greater support among their elected representatives for this 
policy.
Median age of residents in district was also 
significantly related to support for this legislation 
although the relationship was weak (p < .092) and in the 
unexpected positive direction. As the median age in
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district increases so does the support by House members for 
this policy. This finding was contrary to the hypothesized 
relationship. It was conjectured that younger aged 
constituents would be more likely to have or be starting 
families, and these families would be more likely to need 
this policy. It was expected that legislators would be more 
responsive to the needs of these younger aged constituents, 
thus these results were unexpected. There is no evidence 
that the remaining district characteristic variables had any 
impact on the House members' support for the Family and 
Medical Leave Act.
The results of the logistic regression analysis of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act indicate that the variable with 
the greatest impact on the House members' support for this 
policy is their political ideology. Based on the model, 
liberal House members were predicted to be strong supporters 
of this legislation. The only other variable significant in 
the expected direction was proportion of district with 
households headed by a female. The other variables that 
were significant were in the unexpected direction. It 
appears that the political ideology of the member is the 
most important influence on the decision to support Family 
and Medical Leave legislation.
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Family Planning Amendment/Parental Notice (HR 670)
The second case study is an examination of an abortion 
bill that affects minors and requires parental notification. 
Abortion bills were specifically not included in this study 
unless the bill affected minors, which is the circumstance 
in this case study. This policy is an amendment that 
affects federally funded Title X clinics, and requires these 
clinics to give parents a 48-hour notice before performing 
an abortion on a minor. This policy is another excellent 
example of family policy. The objective of this policy is 
to provide support to parents in order that they may carry 
out the responsibilities of parenting and child rearing, 
which again fits the definition of family policy used in 
this study.
The amendment was rejected 179-243 with Republicans 
voting 138 for the policy and 34 against, Democrats voting 
41 for the policy and 208 against, and Independents voting 0 
for the policy and 1 against. The amendment is considered 
to be a conservative policy due to the strong support by 
Republicans (138 - 34) and the strong lack of support by 
Democrats (179- 243). There is another reason this 
legislation could be considered a conservative policy and 
that is that conservatives stake out an anti-abortion
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position in this country. This piece of legislation would 
specifically limit a minor's access to an abortion which is 
consistent with the conservative position on this issue. A 
yea vote on this policy is considered to be a conservative 
position. The predicted directions are reversed from those 
of the liberal legislation in the first case study.
A model of House members' voting on the Family 
Planning/Parental Notice Amendment was tested empirically 
with a logistic regression model. A prediction was made for 
the dependent variable, the vote outcome, based on each 
House member's personal and district characteristics. Table 
14 contains the results for the logistic regression 
analysis.
The model successfully predicted 86% of the votes on 
the Family Planning/Parental Notice Amendment. Of the votes 
that were eligible to be included in the analysis, the model 
accurately predicted the votes of 359 of the 416 House 
members casting votes on this motion. The vote on this 
motion was 175 'yea' votes to 241 'nay' votes. Of the 175 
votes in support of this motion, 146 votes or 83% were 
predicted correctly. Of the 241 against the motion, 213 or 
88% were predicted correctly.
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Table 14
Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for the Roll Call 
Vote on the Family Planning Amendment/Parental Notice (HR 
670)
Variable b t prob.
Personal Characteristics
Political Party - 2.056 -2.958*** .003
Political Ideology 7.798 7.071*** . 000
District Characteristics
Urban .005 .502 .615
Blue Collar - .007 - .308 .758
Military .147 1.878* .060
Women in the Labor Force - .038 - .913 .361
Households with Kids under 18 .179 1.799* . 072
Married Couple Households .089 1.057 .290
Female Headed Households .214 2.194** .028
Black - .025 .979 .327
Hispanic - .008 .559 .590
Median Age .223 1.1995** .046
Intercept -19.489 -2.315** . 019
*** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10
Percentage of Votes Predicted Accurately = 86% 
Pseduo R2= .689
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The personal characteristic variables, political 
ideology and political party, were both highly significant 
predictors of support for the Family Planning/Parental 
Notice Amendment. A conservative political ideology was 
positively and significantly related to support for this 
family policy as expected. As explained above, the expected 
direction of the relationship was reversed because this is a 
conservative family policy. Political party was negatively 
related to support for this policy which meant Republicans 
were less likely to support this policy. This result was 
unexpected. More Democrats actually voted for this 
amendment than Republicans although the vast majority of 
Democrats voted against the Amendment, which may explain the 
unexpected negative direction. Another possible explanation 
may be the inclusion of the other personal characteristic 
variable, political ideology, which may capture much of what 
causes Republicans to vote in a certain way.
Several district characteristic variables were 
significantly related to votes for the Family 
Planning/Parental Notice Amendment. Proportion of district 
residents in the military, proportion of households with 
children under 18, proportion of households headed by 
females, and median age in district were each significantly
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related to this policy. Median age was the only variable 
significant in its hypothesized direction. Proportion 
district residents in the military and proportion of 
households with children under 18 achieved significance only 
by allowing a relaxed standard of significance. The 
variable, proportion of households in district with children 
under 18, is positively related to support for this policy, 
a finding that is unexpected but nonetheless logical in this 
specific example. Parents with children under 18 are the 
group the amendment was written to protect. The amendment 
requires certain clinics to notify parents before an 
abortion can be performed on a minor.
The remaining district characteristics were not 
significantly related to support for this family policy.
This fact, combined with the district characteristics that 
were significant in the unexpected direction, suggests that 
the make-up of the districts did not have a strong impact on 
legislators' voting behaviors in the case of the Family 
Planning/Parental Notice Amendment.
Summary
The two family policy votes chosen for case studies are 
very similar in their purpose: to support the function of 
families, whether it is to protect a monetary support of the
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family through job security or to protect the parent's child 
rearing responsibility in a medical situation. Both of 
these family policy votes meet the criterion to be 
considered family policy legislation.
The first family policy protects a family member's 
means of monetary support for his/her family. The purpose 
of the Family and Medical Leave Act is to protect a family 
member's job if leave is taken whether it is to care for a 
new child or a family member. The second family policy 
provides parents with notification before an abortion is 
performed on their minor child at a federally funded clinic. 
The Family Planning Amendment certainly protects one 
important function parents have in providing for the 
security of their child and aids in the responsibility in 
child rearing.
The findings for both bills were similar and, for the 
most part, were consistent with the findings for all of the 
family policy votes analyzed. Personal characteristics of 
legislators, political ideology and party identification, 
were both strongly related to support for each of the family 
policy. However, political party was in the unexpected 
direction for both family policy votes, and district 
characteristics were not powerful predictors of support for
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the family policy votes. Several district characteristics 
provided moderate predictive success for these two pieces of 
family policy legislation.
Logistic Regression of Family Policy Legislation Over Time 
The final portion of the data analysis is an 
examination of all of the votes cast by legislators over all 
of the sessions of the House included in this study. A 
model of House members' voting on family policy legislation 
was tested empirically with a logistic regression model. In 
this model the dependent variable was dichotomous: 1 = vote 
for the policy and 0 = vote against the policy. All of the 
family policy votes cast were recoded so that all of the 
votes were coded in the liberal direction based on the 
results of the PCA conducted earlier. With logistic 
regression, a prediction of the outcome of all of the 
combined votes is made based on the values for the House 
members' personal and district characteristics at the time 
each vote was cast. The results of the logistic regression 
analysis is contained in Table 15.
The model successfully predicted 87% of the votes for 
all of the votes cast during the 16 years votes were 
collected. There were 37,832 votes cast over the 16 years 
of this study. This model accurately predicted 32,902 of
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Table 15
Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Family Policy
Legislation Over Time, 9 6 th to 
(37, 832 Votes)
103rd Congress, 1979-1994
Variable b t prob.
Personal Characteristics
Political Party - .073 -1.355 .175
Political Ideology - 5.763 61.930*** .000
District Characteristics
Urban .005 4.300*** .000
Blue Collar .004 1.480 .139
Military .010 1.302 .193
Women in the Labor Force .002 1.150 .250
Households with Kids under 18 .020 3 .246*** .001
Married Couple Households .005 1.328 .184
Female Headed Households - . 074 - .839 .401
Black - .004 -1.833* .067
Hispanic .004 2.091** .037
Median Age .063 6.732*** .000
Intercept - 5.170 -8.217** .000
*** pc.Ol ** p<.05 * p<.10
Percentage of Votes Predicted Accurately = 87% 
Pseduo R2= 1.000
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these House members' votes. There were 24,026 'yea' votes 
cast for family policy legislation, and 21,942 or 91% of 
these votes were predicted correctly. There were 13,806 
'nay' votes cast for family policy legislation, and 10,960 
or 80% of these votes were predicted correctly.
The first of the two personal characteristic variables, 
political party, was not significantly related to family 
policy voting behavior over time. It was expected that 
Republicans would be less likely to vote for the family 
policy legislation over time. The second personal 
characteristic variable, political ideology, was strongly 
significantly related to family policy voting behavior over 
time. As predicted, House members with a conservative 
ideology were less likely to vote for family policy over 
time.
Surprisingly, only a few of the district 
characteristics were significantly related to House members' 
family policy voting behaviors over time when it was 
expected that all of the district characteristics would be 
significant. The proportion of district that is urban was 
significantly related to family policy voting behaviors over 
time in the expected positive direction. As hypothesized, 
the legislators from highly urban areas were more likely to
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support new government legislation. The findings in this 
study suggest that the variable, districts with a high level 
of urbanization is a strong predictor of family policy
voting behavior when voting behaviors are examined over
time.
Proportion of district whose residents are blue collar 
workers was not significantly related to family policy
voting behavior over time. Blue collar workers in this
study was used as a proxy for labor union support which in 
past studies has been highly related to support for social 
policies. In this study it was expected that districts with 
a high proportion of blue collar workers would also be more 
supportive of new family policy legislation. This finding 
suggests that the impact of labor unions, as measured as the 
proportion of blue collar workers in district, is not a good 
predictor of family policy voting behavior over time.
Proportion of district residents that are in the 
military was not significantly related to family policy 
voting behaviors over time. This finding was surprising 
because it was expected that legislators from districts with 
a high proportion of residents who are in the military would 
support family policy legislation. These results indicate
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that proportion of district that is in the military is not a 
good predictor of family policy voting behavior over time.
Proportion of district with women in the labor force 
was not significantly related to family policy voting 
behavior over time. It was hypothesized that the greater 
the number of women in the labor force in a district the 
more supportive the legislator would be toward family policy 
legislation. These results suggest that this variable is 
not a useful predictor of House members' family policy 
voting behaviors over time.
Proportion of households with children under 18 was 
significantly related to family policy voting over time in 
the expected positive direction. These findings suggest 
that the variable, proportion of households with children 
under 18 was a strong predictor of House members' family 
policy voting behaviors over time.
Proportion of households composed of married couples 
was not significantly related to family policy voting 
behaviors over time. It was expected that the greater the 
number of married couples in a district the more supportive 
the legislator would be toward family policy legislation. 
These results suggest that this variable is not a useful
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
predictor of House members' family policy voting behaviors 
over time.
Proportion of households that are headed by a female 
was not significantly related family policy voting behaviors 
over time. It was hypothesized that the greater the number 
of households headed by a female in a district the more 
supportive the legislator would be toward family policy 
legislation. These results suggest that this variable is 
not a useful predictor of House members' family policy 
voting behaviors over time.
Proportion of district that is black was significantly 
related to family policy voting behaviors over time.
However, this variable is related to family policy voting 
behaviors over time in the unexpected negative direction and 
only by allowing a relaxed standard of significance. It was 
hypothesized that legislators from districts with a high 
proportion of black residents would support new family 
policy legislation and these results directly contradict 
this expectation. These results suggest that legislators 
that represent districts with a high proportion of black 
residents would be less likely to support family policy 
legislation.
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Proportion of district that is Hispanic was predictive 
of family policy voting behaviors over time in the expected 
positive direction. It was hypothesized that legislators 
from districts with a high proportion of Hispanic residents 
would be more likely to support family policy legislation.
Median age in district was predictive of family policy 
voting behaviors over time. Median age was positively 
related to family policy voting behavior over time, which 
was contrary to what was expected. Median age was 
hypothesized to have a negative relationship with family 
policy liberalism because these family policies were more 
likely to affect younger constituents.
Summary
The results of this logistic regression analysis of 
family policy voting behaviors over time suggest the 
greatest impact on House members' support for family policy 
legislation is their political ideology. The strength of 
this variable combined with its significance level suggests 
that it is the strongest predictor of the voting behaviors 
of House members over time. Based on this model, members 
with a conservative ideology were less likely to vote for 
family policy legislation over time.
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There were also several district characteristics that 
were significantly related to family policy voting behaviors 
over time. Proportion of district that is in an urban area, 
proportion of district that is households with children 
under 18, and proportion of district that is Hispanic 
residents were each significantly related in the expected 
positive direction with family policy voting behaviors over 
time. The other variables that were significant were in an 
unexpected direction.
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CONCLUSION
Introduction
The present study had two objectives. The first was to 
determine whether a family policy domain exists among the 
legislation considered by the U.S. House of Representatives 
during the years 1979 to 1994, and the second objective was 
to predict and explain the roll call voting behavior of U.S. 
House members toward family policy legislation. After a 
thorough review of relevant literature and theories of 
legislative decision making, and an overview of the results 
of the data analysis, this chapter includes a discussion and 
some of the conclusions that may be drawn from examination 
of the two objectives of this study.
A Family Policy Domain 
The first objective of the research is to determine 
whether a family policy domain exists among the legislation 
considered by the U.S. House of Representatives during the 
years 1979 to 1994. It was critical in this study to 
identify the appropriate legislation to be considered family 
policy. The first step in this analysis was to define 
family policy. This definition was used by two separate 
investigators who analyzed the entire body of votes 
considered by the House for all of the years of this study.
107
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These two investigators identified all of the family policy 
votes that met the definition. A third investigator chose 
from the two sets of family policy votes, the final group of 
votes that were used for this study.
A principal components analysis was conducted to 
determine if there was a family policy domain that emerged 
in the roll call votes. After conducting a principal 
components analysis in each session of the House, a single 
factor emerged that explained from 48.4% to 77.4% of the 
variance. The results of the principal components analysis 
are evidence that a family policy domain exists for each 
session of the House. The strength of the first factor that 
emerged in each session suggests that this factor represents 
an underlying family policy domain represented in these roll 
call votes.
The presence of a family policy domain within each 
session of the House suggests that legislators have an 
identifiable policy position on family policy legislation as 
they do for other domains of policy. Clausen (1972) 
described the process by which legislators make voting 
decisions on bills from different policy domains.
Legislators have a predetermined policy position for 
different domains of public policy. The results of the
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principal components analysis in this study confirm that 
family policy legislation exists as an independent policy 
domain. Legislators, therefore, have a predetermined 
position on family policy legislation just as they do for 
other policy domains.
In conclusion, the goal of identifying a body of votes 
that can be labeled as family policy legislation is achieved 
in the House of Representatives during the years of this 
study. These results establish that House members certainly 
hold predetermined policy positions on the legislation that 
in this study is defined as family policy. Family policy 
can be identified as an independent policy domain just as 
defense and education have been identified as policy 
domains.
Roll Call Voting on Family Policy Legislation 
The second objective of the present study was to 
predict and explain the roll call voting behavior of U.S. 
House members toward family policy legislation. Three 
methods for analyzing the roll call votes were used in the 
study to determine the possible relationships between the 
personal and district characteristics and legislators' 
family policy roll call voting behavior. The three methods 
of analysis were an OLS regression analysis of family policy
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liberalism, a logistic regression analysis of each family 
policy vote, and a logistic regression analysis of all of 
the family policy votes over all of the years of the study. 
Using the results of the three separate analyses conducted 
on the family policy votes, an assessment can be made of how 
well each variable in the model predicts and explains the 
voting behaviors of the House members.
In short, the personal characteristics of the 
legislators have the greatest explanatory and predictive 
power in determining roll call voting behavior on family 
policy legislation. The district characteristics vary in 
their effect on House members' voting behaviors. Some 
variables have a consistent effect on the voting behaviors, 
while others appeared to have no effect on the family policy 
behaviors of the House members. The findings in this 
current study are similar to the findings of Monroe and 
Garand (1991) and Tiller (1994) which also indicated that 
political ideology is very important in predicting 
legislative voting behavior.
Political party had a stable significant effect on 
legislators' family policy voting behaviors in this study, 
but it was not a significant factor in the logistic 
regression analysis of family policy votes over time.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ill
Because political party was consistently significant in the 
OLS regression analysis of family policy liberalism voting 
behavior and in the logistic regression analyses of each 
individual family policy vote, it was possible that the 
political ideology variable captured much of what causes 
Republicans and Democrats to vote in different ways.
Political ideology was the most significant factor in 
this study in predicting or explaining the family policy 
roll call votes of the House members. In all three separate 
analyses, political ideology was the strongest predictor of 
the voting behaviors of the legislators. The results of 
this study indicate that the political ideology of 
legislators is the most important characteristic in 
understanding how or why legislators cast family policy 
votes.
Poole and Rosenthal (1991, 1997) argued that ideology 
is the most important factor in predicting a roll call vote 
in any policy domain. In this study the political ideology 
coded in the conservative direction was significant in 
almost all of the family policy votes; therefore, it has the 
greatest predictive and explanatory power of all of the 
variables.
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Proportion of district that is urban had the most 
consistent and systematic effect on House members' voting 
behavior of the district characteristics variables. In the 
OLS regression analysis of family policy liberalism voting 
behaviors, proportion of district that is urban was 
significant in six of the eight sessions analyzed. In the 
logistic regression analysis of the individual family policy 
votes, proportion of district that is urban was 
significantly related to House members' voting behavior in 
27% of the family policy votes. Finally, in the logistic 
regression analysis of family policy votes over time, 
proportion of district that is urban was a highly 
significant predictor (p < .000) of family policy voting 
behaviors over the eight sessions of the House examined.
The results of the analyses conducted establish that this 
district characteristic, proportion of district that is 
urban, is a factor that has some influence on House members' 
family policy voting behaviors.
The results of this study also suggest proportion of 
households in district that have children under eighteen is 
a moderately consistent predictor of family policy voting 
behaviors. In the OLS regression analysis of family policy 
liberalism voting behaviors, proportion of households in
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district that have children under eighteen was significant 
in three of the six sessions for which this variable was 
available and analyzed. In the logistic regression analysis 
of the individual family policy votes, proportion of 
households in district that have children under eighteen was 
significantly related to House members' voting behavior in 
17% of the family policy votes. In the logistic regression 
analysis of family policy votes over time, proportion of 
households in district that have children under eighteen was 
a highly significant predictor (p < .001) of family policy 
voting behaviors over all of the family policy votes during 
the six sessions of the House for which data for this 
variable were available. The results of these analyses 
establish that this district characteristic, proportion of 
households in district that have children under eighteen, is 
a factor that has a small but consistent influence on House 
members' family policy voting behaviors.
The median age in district also had a small but 
consistent influence on House members' family policy voting 
behaviors. In the OLS regression analysis of family policy 
liberalism voting behaviors, median age in district was 
significant in two of the eight sessions analyzed. In the 
logistic regression analysis of the individual family policy
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votes, median age in district was significantly related to 
House members' voting behavior in 24% of the family policy 
votes. Finally, in the logistic regression analysis of 
family policy votes over time, median age in district was a 
highly significant predictor (p < .000) of family policy 
voting behaviors over the eight sessions of the House 
examined. The results of the analyses establish that this 
district characteristic, the age of residents in a district, 
is a factor that has some influence on House members' family 
policy voting behaviors.
Initially, the results of this study may seem to 
confirm Poole and Rosenthal's unidimensional theory of 
legislative voting behavior. However, the findings may 
actually support Clausen's multidimensional theory. While 
political ideology is the strongest explanatory factor, 
there are other factors that have a small but systematic 
effect in influencing House members' voting behavior.
The explanatory and predictive power of the district 
characteristic variables are not as powerful as political 
ideology, but these variables are significantly and 
consistently related to members' family policy voting 
behaviors over time. This finding suggests that these 
district characteristics explain in part why legislators
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cast their family policy votes. Clausen explains that 
legislators place roll call votes into different policy 
domains and then vote according to the member's 
predetermined opinion of that policy domain. The results of 
the present study establish there is a family policy domain 
among the legislation considered by Congress, thus 
confirming Clausen's policy dimension theory.
In Clausen's study of roll call voting in different 
policy domains, the liberal/conservative dimension or 
legislator's political ideology was a strong and significant 
factor in explaining roll call voting, but what is important 
is that other factors were also significant in explaining 
roll call voting in the different policy domains. The 
results of this study are similar to those of Clausen. The 
present study establishes that roll call voting is more 
complex than Poole and Rosenthal's unidimensional theory 
suggests. The results indicate that while political 
ideology is the strongest factor and has the greatest 
systematic effect on family policy voting behavior, other 
variables did have a significant effect on family policy 
legislation voting behaviors.
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Implications
Examining the results of the study, it appears that few 
of the variables included in the study have a systematic 
effect on family policy voting behavior of U.S. House 
members. The personal characteristics of the legislators 
were significantly related in a high percentage of the 
family policy votes. The political ideology of the 
legislators is the most significant and consistent factor in 
predicting and explaining family policy voting behaviors of 
legislators. A few of the district characteristics also had 
a systematic effect on family policy voting behavior, but 
not as substantial as political ideology. Proportion of 
district that is urban, proportion of district that is 
black, and median age in district are all significantly 
related to voting behavior in over 20% of the family policy 
votes. The rest of the factors were related to voting 
behaviors less than 20% of the time. The results provide 
reason to question legislators' responsiveness toward their 
constituencies. The results of the study indicate the needs 
and desires of the people in their district are less a part 
of legislators' decision making process than are the 
personal characteristics of the legislator.
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Another important implication of this study is the 
usefulness of these results to family and child groups. 
Lobbyists for child and family groups should use this 
information to make strategic decisions about which 
legislators to approach for support for family policy 
legislation. Child and family advocates with limited 
resources could make more informed choices about which 
legislators are likely to support important legislation.
Future Studies
First, the present study established that a family 
policy domain exists in the legislation considered by the 
House. The family policy domain is stable when tested over 
time. After examining the family policy legislation, only a 
limited number of factors have been identified as 
systematically predicting or explaining the voting behaviors 
of legislators toward family policy legislation. Future 
studies might identify other relevant factors that also 
predict and explain family policy voting behaviors.
Second, the study could also be replicated for the U.S. 
Senate or at the state level. Studies conducted at the 
state level would address one of the limitations of this 
study. Important legislation that affect families occurs at 
the state level. If the findings of this study were
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supported by additional studies at different levels of the 
government, a compelling argument could be made for the 
existence of a family policy domain not just at the federal 
level but at the state level as well.
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1979
1. P559 - Welfare Reform (HR 4904) . November 1, 1979. Bill 
to establish a national minimum for welfare benefits, 
require states to provide coverage to unemployed two- 
parent families with children, reduce state costs, and 
make administrative changes designed to reduce benefits 
to some recipients.
Adopted: Yea 209 - Nay 177
Republican Vote (R) Yea 1 - Nay 139 
Democratic Vote (D) Yea 208 - Nay 38
2. P560 - Welfare Reform (HR 4904) . November 1, 1979. 
Consideration of a bill to establish a national minimum 
for welfare benefits, require states to provide 
coverage to two-parents families with children, reduce 
state costs, and make administrative changes designed 
to reduce benefits to some recipients.
Adopted 202-181: R 1-139; D 201-42.
3. P566 - Welfare Reform (HR 4904) . November 7, 1979. 
Amendment establishing a demonstration program 
providing eight states and three counties with block 
grants to run welfare programs according to their own 
design, and to allow states to establish their own work 
requirements for welfare recipients, as long as they 
did not require work from parents who were caring for 
children under six years old unless adequate day care 
was available.
Rejected 200-205: R 148-0; D 52-205.
4. P567 - Welfare Reform (HR 4904) . November 7, 1979. Bill 
to establish a minimum welfare benefit, require states 
to provide coverage to unemployed two-parent families 
with children, reduce benefits to some recipients. 
Adopted 222-184: R 29-118; D 193-66.
5. P631 - Child Health (HR 4962) . December 6, 1979. 
Amendment to authorize $3.15 billion for new health 
services and broadened eligibility under Medicaid for 
children and pregnant women.
Rejected 152-226: R 110-28; D 42-198.
6. P635 - Child Health (HR 4962) . December 11, 1979. 
Amendment requiring parental consent before family 
planning services.
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Rejected 163-225: R 103-39; D 60-186.
7. P643 - Domestic Violence (HR 2977). December 12, 1979.
Bill to establish a new, three-year program, authorized 
at a total of $65 million, for grants to state and 
local efforts to prevent domestic violence and aid its 
victims.
Adopted 292-106: R 73-75; D 219-31.
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1980
1. P201 - Food Stamps (S 1309) . May 8, 1980. Amendment to 
reduce food stamps benefits to families whose children 
were eligible for free lunches at school.
Rejected 134-269: R 98-51; D 36-218.
2. P204 - Food Stamps (S 1309) . May 8, 1980. Amendment to 
require families who had received food stamps at some 
time during the year, but had annual incomes over 175 
percent of the poverty level, to repay some or all of 
their food stamps benefits.
Adopted 241-147: R 136-5; D 105-142.
3. P406 - Housing and Community Development (HR 7262) . 
August 18, 1980. Amendment to increase to $75,000, from 
$60,000, the mortgage limit for middle-income families 
buying single-family homes in high cost areas under the 
revised. Section 235 homeownership assistance program 
and to authorize the housing and urban secretary to 
boost the $75,000 mortgage limit another 75 percent in 
very high cost areas.
Rejected 117-247: R 23-107; D 94-140.
4. P547 - Domestic Violence (HR 2977). October 1, 1980. 
Bill to provide federal funds to states to set up 
shelters for victims of domestic violence.
Adopted 276-117: R 76-72; D 200-45.
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1981
1. P260 - Food and Agriculture Act (HR 3603) . October 22,
1981. Amendment to require most food stamp recipients 
to pay for a portion of their stamps.
Rejected 147-251: R 134-40; D 13-211.
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1982
1. Pll - Federal Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules 
(HR 5366). March 2, 1982. Bill to provide permanent 
authority for federal agencies to establish flexible 
employee work schedules as an alternative to the 
traditional 8-hour day.
Rejected 255-142: R 64-113; D 191-29.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
129
1983
1. P4 - Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families 
(HRes 16). February 2, 1983. Establish the House Select 
Committee on Children, Youth and Families, which could 
hold hearing but would not have legislative 
jurisdiction.
Adopted 312-69: R 89-55; D 223-14.
2. P125 - Meals for Older Americans (HR 2807) . May 24,
1983. Bill to increase authorized funding levels of 
meals served under the Older Americans Act.
Adopted 386-31: R 133-30; D 253-1.
3. P164 - Follow Through Amendments (HR 2148) . June 7,
1983. Bill to extend the Follow Through program. The 
program provides educational, health, nutritional and 
social services to disadvantaged children previously 
enrolled in such preschool programs as Head Start. 
Adopted 288-132: R 46-117; D 242-15.
4. P298 - Unemployment Health Insurance (HR 3021). August 
3, 1983. Bill for block grants to states for health 
insurance plans for the unemployed, and also required 
certain changes in employment-based private group 
health insurance plans to continue coverage for laid- 
off workers.
Adopted 227-196: R 0-165; D 227-31.
5. P300 - Unemployment Health Insurance (HR 3021). August 
3, 1983. Bill for block grants to states for health 
insurance plans for the unemployed, and for grants to 
hospitals caring for needy, uninsured people. Required 
certain changes in employment-based private group 
health insurance plans to continue coverage for laid- 
off workers.
Adopted 252-174: R 37-129; D 215-45.
6. P316 - Rehabilitation Act Amendments (HR 3520) . 
September 13, 1983. Bill to authorize state grant 
vocational rehabilitation programs; to create a federal 
program to assist in the education of immigrant 
children.
Adopted 324-79: R 78-75; D 246-4.
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7. P387 - School Lunch and Child Nutrition (HR 4091) .
October 25, 1983. Bill to raise income eligibility 
standards and reduce student prices for federally 
subsidized lunches and breakfasts and to make other 
changes in federal child nutrition programs.
Adopted 306-114: R 53-110; D 253-4.
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1984
1. P13 - Child Abuse Amendments (HR 1904) . February 2,
1984. Amendment to strike language requiring states 
federal child-protection grants to ensure that severely 
handicapped infants receive adequate medical treatment 
and nutrition and instead to establish a study 
commission.
Rejected 182-231: R 31-131; D 151-100.
2. P14 - Child Abuse Amendments (HR 1904) . February 2, 
1984. Amendment for programs to prevent family 
violence and to provide shelter to victims of family 
violence.
Adopted 367-31: R 129-28; D 238-3.
3. P66 - Child Nutrition (HR 7). April 10, 1984. Bill to 
reauthorize child nutrition programs through 1988, to 
liberalize eligibility and benefits in certain 
programs, and make other changes.
Adopted 275-125: R 36-122; D 239-3.
4. P70 - Child Nutrition (HR 7). April 11, 1984. Amendment 
to strike authorization for "tiering" in the federal 
chi Id-care food program. If certain percentages of 
children in a home child-care system were poor enough 
to qualify for free or reduced-price meals, all 
children in the program may receive such meals.
Rejected 140-262: R 130-24; D 10-238.
5. P93 - Child Nutrition (HR 7). May 1, 1984. Bill for 
child nutrition programs from four to three years, 
through fiscal 1987.
Rejected 136-270: R 116-45; D 20-225.
6. P94 - Child Nutrition (HR 7). May 1, 1984. Bill for 
child nutrition programs through 1988, providing a 
four-year total of $9 billion in budget authority for 
the programs.
Adopted 343-72: R 95-67; D 248-5.
7. P196 - Human Services Amendments (HR 5145) . June 7,
1984. Bill to reauthorize Head Start, Community 
Services Block Grants, and other social services 
programs through fiscal 1989.
Rejected 261-156: R 26-133; D 235-23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
132
8. P201 - Family Planning Block Grant (HR 5600). June 11,
1984. Bill to authorize money for preventive health 
services block grants, family planning and the 
adolescent family life programs.
Adopted 290-102: R 66-80; D 224-22.
9. P305 - Hunger Relief Act (HR 5151) . August 1, 1984.
Bill to liberalize certain eligibility and benefit
levels in the food stamp program, to increase federal 
penalties against states for program errors and to make 
other changes.
Adopted 364-39: R 122-38; D 242-1.
10. P369 - Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal 1985 (HJ RES 
648). September 25, 1984. Amendment to provide money to 
states to train child-care facility staff and parents 
of attending children in the prevention of child abuse. 
Adopted 369-37: R 131-25; D 238-12.
11. P376 - Preventive Health Care (HR 5538). October 1,
1984. Bill to authorize money for preventive health 
programs, including childhood immunization, venereal 
disease and tuberculosis control and for preventive 
health block grants.
Adopted 368-18: R 129-17; D 239-1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
133
1985
1. P147 - Family Planning Assistance (HR 236 9 )  . June 18,
1985. Bill to extend federal aid for family planning 
services through fiscal 1988.
Rejected 214-197: R 38-137; D 176-60.
2. P274 - School Lunch and Child Nutrition Act (HR 7) .
September 12, 1985. Bill to reauthorize and revise
school lunch and child nutrition programs.
Adopted 266-142: R 39-135; D 227-7.
3. P280 - School Lunch and Child Nutrition Act (HR 7) .
September 18, 1985. Amendment to eliminate the fiscal
1986 cost-of-living adjustment to the rates of federal 
reimbursement to schools for meals served in school 
lunch and child nutrition programs, except for the 
supplemental feeding program for needy pregnant women, 
infants, and children.
Rejected 143-284: R 131-50; D 12-234.
4. P281 - School Lunch and Child Nutrition Act (HR 7) .
September 18, 1985. Amendment to eliminate the cash
subsidy for school lunches for children from families 
with incomes above 250 percent of the poverty line. 
Rejected 174-254: R 156-25; D 18-234.
5. P282 - School Lunch and Child Nutrition Act (HR 7) .
September 18, 1985. Amendment to eliminate the cash and
commodity subsidy for lunches for children from
families with incomes above 250 percent of the poverty 
line.
Rejected 146-279: R 133-48; D 13-231.
6. P283 - School Lunch and Child Nutrition Act (HR 7) .
September 18, 1985. Bill to authorize five child 
nutrition programs: the special supplemental feeding 
program for needy pregnant women, infants, and 
children; a summer food service program for children; 
nutrition education and training; a surplus commodity 
distribution program; and payments to states for 
administrative costs.
Adopted 367-59: R 124-58; D 243-1.
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1986
1. P22 - Health Services Amendment (HR 2418) . February 19,
1986. Bill to reauthorize federal aid for community and 
migrant health centers.
Rejected 254-151: R 34-136; D 220-15.
2. P33 - Health Services Amendment (HR 2418) . March 5,
1986. Amendment to freeze appropriation levels for 
community and migrant health centers and to retain 
authority for the optional primary care block grants, 
which states can choose to receive in lieu of 
categorical aid to their health clinics.
Rejected 94-319: R 93-77; D 1-242.
3. P94 - Community Services Programs (HR 4421) . April 29,
1986. Bill to reauthorize the Head Start, Follow 
Through, Community Services Block Grant, Dependent Care 
and Community Food and Nutrition programs.
Adopted 377-33: R 137-33; D 240-0.
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1987
1. P154 - Older Americans Act (HR 1451) . May 28, 1987. 
Amendment to authorize money for demonstration projects 
to test ways to assist senior citizens who receive home 
care.
Adopted 274-115: R 53-108; D 221-7.
2. P172 - Housing and Community Development/Option to Buy 
(HR 4) . June 10, 1987. Amendment to provide that lower- 
income families residing in public housing be given the 
opportunity to purchase the dwelling units in any 
public housing project through an established resident 
management corporation.
Adopted 258-161: R 16-155; D 242-6.
3. P430 - Older Americans Act (HR 1451). November 17,
1987. Bill to authorize a four-year extension of the 
Older Americans Act of 1965. The measure covers such 
programs as adult day-care centers, transportation, 
legal help, meals, Alzheimer's disease research, and 
the Community Service Employment Program, which helps 
pay for part-time jobs for low-income people over 55 
years old.
Adopted 404-7: R 158-7; D 246-0.
4. P485 - Welfare Reform/Reduced Funding, Child Support, 
Day Care (HR 1720). December 16, 1987. Bill to convert 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children into a national 
program of education, training and work to help welfare 
recipients gain permanent private-sector jobs.
Adopted 336-87: R 174-2; D 162-85.
5. P486 - Welfare Reform (HR 1720). December 16, 1987.
Alternative to the bill to revise the welfare system.
Rejected 173-251: R 170-6; D 3-245.
6. P487 - Welfare Reform (HR 1720) . December 16, 1987.
Bill to change the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program to a Family Support Program 
emphasizing education, training and work for welfare 
recipients, with the federal government paying 65 
percent of the cost.
Adopted 230-194: R 13-163; D 217-31.
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1988
1. P114 - Overseas Teachers Act (HR 3424). May 10, 1988. 
Bill to establish a hiring preference for teaching jobs 
in elementary and secondary schools abroad that are run 
by the Department of Defense for the children of U.S. 
military personnel.
Rejected 157-262: R 10-264; D 147-98.
2. P172 - Children's Television Programs (HR 3966) . June 
8, 1988. Bill to limit advertisement on children's 
television programs to 10.5 minutes per hour on 
weekends and to 12 minutes per hour on weekday, and to 
require the federal Communications commission to 
determine if a station's overall programming has served 
children's "educational and informational needs" when 
deciding whether to renew its broadcasting license. 
Adopted 328-78: R 96-71; D 232-7.
3. P176 - Long-Term Home Care (HR 3436) . June 8, 1988.
Bill to make technical corrections to the Older 
Americans Act reauthorization to add to the Medicare 
program coverage of long-term home-care services for 
chronically ill Americans of all ages.
Rejected 169-243: R 24-144; D 145-99.
4. P201 - Fair Housing/Discrimination Against Families (HR
1158). June 23, 1988. Amendments to delete the 
provision barring discrimination in housing because a
family has young children.
Rejected 116-289: R 95-73; D 21-216.
5. P214 - Fair Housing/Discrimination Against Pregnant 
Women (HR 1158) . June 29, 1988. Amendment to bar 
discrimination in the sale or rental of housing to 
pregnant women.
Adopted 241-159: R 145-20; D 96-139.
6. P338 - AIDS Federal Policy/Testing for Marriage-License 
Applicants (HR 5142). September 22, 1988. Amendment to 
require states in which the incidence of the virus that 
causes AIDS is more than .1 percent, as a condition for 
receiving funds authorized by the bill, to require 
marriage-license applicants to be tested in order to 
receive such a license.
Rejected 91-304: R 89-73; D 2-231.
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7. P373 - Welfare Reform (HR 1720). September 30, 1988.
Bill to require states to strengthen child-support 
enforcement; establish and operate education, training 
and employment programs to move welfare recipients off 
the rolls into jobs; provide child care and 
transportation needed to permit welfare recipients to 
participate; and continue child care and Medicaid 
coverage for 12 months after welfare recipients leave 
the rolls for jobs.
Adopted 347-53: R 142-19; D 205-34.
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1989
1. P203 - Health and Human Services Appropriations (HR
2990). August 2, 1989. Bill to appropriate monies for 
entitlement programs such as Medicare and Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children.
Adopted 365-58: R 117-57; D 248-1.
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1990
1. P54 - Child Care Rule (HR 3) . March 29, 1990. Bill to 
expand programs providing federal aid for child care 
and increase the earned income tax credit for poor 
working families with children.
Adopted 246-176: R 0-171; D 246-5.
2. P55 - Child Care Mandate (HR 3). March 29, 1990. 
Amendment to permit rather than require states to have 
a child-care voucher program.
Rejected 182-243: R 10-163; D 172-80.
3. P57 - Child Care Substitute (HR 3) . March 29, 1990. 
Amendment to provide expanded funding for Head Start 
and for the Social Services Block Grant program and to 
increase the existing earned income tax credit for poor 
working families with children.
Rejected 195-225: R 157-14; D 38-211.
4. P58 - Child Care (HR 3). March 29, 1990. Amendment to 
expand programs providing federal aid for child care 
and increase the earned income tax credit for poor 
working families with children.
Adopted 263-158: R 39-132; D 224-26.
5. P59 - Child Care (HR 3). March 29, 1990. Bill to expand
programs providing federal aid for child care and
increase the earned income tax credit for poor working 
families with children, with instructions to hold 
hearing on the bill and its net deficit effects. 
Rejected 152-259: R 151-16; D 1-243.
6. P60 - Child Care (HR 3). March 29, 1990. Bill to expand
programs providing federal aid for child care and
increase the earned income tax credit for poor working 
families with children.
Adopted 265-145: R 47-119; D 218-26.
7. P104 - Parental and Medical Leave Act (HR 770) . May 9, 
1990. Bill to require employers to provide benefits for 
employees with a new child, a seriously ill child or 
parent, or a serious health condition.
Adopted 251-151: R 18-146; D 233-5.
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8. P105 - Parental and Medical Leave Act Substitute (HR
770). May 10, 1990. Amendment to require the federal
government and private companies with 50 or more 
employees to provide employees with up to 12 weeks per 
year of unpaid leave to care for a new child, or a 
seriously ill child, parent or spouse, or to use as 
medical leave due to a serious health condition. Only 
one parent at a time may take leave to care for a 
newborn, and leave to care for a seriously ill person 
could be used only for a spouse, a biological parent or 
a person raised by the employee. Illness must be 
certified by a doctor.
Adopted 259-157: R 47-123; D 212-34.
9. P106 - Parental and Medical Leave Act (HR 770). May 10,
1990. Bill to establish a commission to study and make 
recommendations on existing and proposed policies 
regarding family and medical leave.
Rejected 155-264: R 129-39; D 26-225.
10. P107 - Parental and Medical Leave Act (HR 770) . May 10,
1990. Bill to require public and private employers to 
give unpaid leave to care for a new child, or a 
seriously ill child, parent or spouse, or to use as 
medical leave to due to a serious health condition. 
Adopted 237-187: R 39-133; D 198-54.
11. P262 - Family and Medical Leave Act/Veto Override. (HR 
770). July 25, 1990. Passage over President Bush's 
veto, of the bill to require public and private 
employers to give unpaid leave to care for a newborn 
child or a seriously ill child, parent or spouse, or to 
use as medical leave due to a serious health condition. 
Rejected 232-195: R 38-138; D 194-57.
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1991
1. P226 - National Adolescent Survey (HR 2507) . July 25,
1991. Amendment to earmark money to conduct a study for 
the purpose of gathering information on the health and 
well-being of adolescents in the United States.
Adopted 271-142: R 33-123; D 237-19.
2. P347 - Head Start (HR 3543). October 29, 1991.
Amendment to provide additional funds for the Head 
Start preschool program, the Women, Infants and 
Children nutrition program and the childhood 
immunization program.
Adopted 243-180: R 30-134; D 212-46.
3. P382 - Healthy Start Program (HR 2707). November 6,
1991. Amendment to provide funds for the Healthy Start 
Program.
Adopted 253-168: R 29-132; D 223-36.
4. P389 - Family and Medical Leave Act (HR 2) . November 
13, 1991. Bill to require employers with 50 or more 
employees to provide up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave a 
year for a serious illness, to care for a new child, or 
to care for a seriously ill child, spouse or parent. 
Adopted 269-156: R 11-151; D 257-5; I 1-0.
5. P390 - Family and Medical Leave Act/Preferential Hiring 
Rights (HR 2) . November 13, 1991. Amendment to allow 
parents of young children to take up to six years of 
unpaid leave and workers caring for an ill family 
member to take up to two years of unpaid leave and 
still have preferential hiring rights.
Rejected 138-291: R 107-56; D 31-234.
6. P391 - Family and Medical Leave Act/Substitute (HR 2) . 
November 13, 1991. Substitute amendment to raise the 
number of hours an employee must work in order to be 
eligible for up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave from 1,000 
to 1,250 a year, require employees to provide 30 days' 
notice in non-emergency cases before taking leave, as 
opposed to "reasonable notice" as provided in the bill, 
among other changes.
Adopted 287-143: R 48-115; D 238-28; I 1-0.
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7. P392 - Family and Medical Leave Act Motion (HR 2) . 
November 13, 1991. Bill providing eight weeks of unpaid 
leave for the birth or adoption of a child.
Rejected 119-312: R 103-61; D 16-250.
8. P393 - Family and Medical Leave Act (HR 2). November 
13, 1991. Bill to require employers with 50 or more 
employees to provide up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave a 
year for a serious illness, the birth or adoption of a 
child, or to care for a seriously ill child, spouse or 
parent.
Adopted 253-177: R 35-129; D 217-48.
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1992
1. P369 - Child Welfare Nutrition Programs (HR 3603) .
August 6, 1 9 9 2 .  Bill to help abused and neglected
children and lessen reliance on the foster-care system. 
The bill contained provisions aimed at alleviating 
child hunger by expanding eligibility for food stamps. 
Adopted 247-166: R 0-160; D 246-6; I 1-0.
2. P370 - Child Welfare Nutrition Programs Rule (HR 3603).
August 6, 1992. Bill to help abused and neglected
children and lessen reliance on the foster-care system. 
The bill contained provisions aimed at alleviating 
child hunger by expanding eligibility for food stamps. 
Adopted 220-196: R 1-159; D 218-37; I 1-0.
3. P371 - Child Welfare Nutrition Programs Motion (HR 
3603). August 6, 1992. Motions to eliminate the child 
hunger relief provisions of the bill and replace 
entitlement for training and administrative expenses 
for foster care and adoption assistance with a capped 
entitlement program under which states could use the 
funding for any child welfare purpose.
Rejected 191-230: R 159-3; D 32-226; I 0-1.
4. P372 - Child Welfare Nutrition Programs (HR 3603) . 
August 6, 1992. Bill to help abused and neglected 
children and lessen reliance on the foster-care system; 
create a new child welfare entitlement; expand food 
stamp eligibility.
Adopted 256-163: R 19-144; D 236-19; I 1-0.
5. P379 - Agriculture Appropriations (HR 5487). August 11,
1992. Bill to provide appropriations for domestic food 
and nutrition programs, including the food stamps 
program and the Women, Infants, and Children program. 
Adopted 299-100: R 81-75; D 217-25.
6. P385 - Neighborhood Schools Improvement Act (HR 4323) .
August 12, 1992. Bill to provide a five-year 
demonstration program to determine whether waivers of 
certain federal and state laws enable schools to serve 
disadvantaged children more effectively.
Rejected 80-328: R 79-76; D 1-251.
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7. P389 - Family Leave (S 5). September 10, 1992. 
Consideration of the Conference report to require 
companies with more than 50 employees to provide 
workers with up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for family 
emergencies.
Adopted 329-71: R 87-71; D 241-0.
8. P390 - Family Leave (S 5). September 10, 1992. 
Conference report to require companies with more than 
50 employees to provide workers with up to 12 weeks of 
unpaid leave for family emergencies. Employers would 
have to continue health care coverage and could not 
hire a permanent replacement.
Adopted 241-161: R 37-119; D 203-42; I 1-0.
9. P430 - Family and Medical Leave Act Veto Override (S 
5). September 25, 1992. Postpone veto override on the 
bill to require companies with more than 50 employees 
to provide workers with up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave 
for family emergencies.
Adopted 239-139: R 15-134; D 223-5.
10. P420 - Domestic Partnership (HR 5517). September 24,
1992. Motion to prohibit the District of Columbia from 
using any funds in the bill to extend employment, 
health or governmental benefits to homosexual or 
heterosexual unmarried couples ("domestic partners") on 
the same basis that such benefits were extended to 
legally married couples.
Adopted 235-173: R 144-16; D 91-156.
11. P443 - Family and Medical Leave Act Veto Override (S 
5). September 30, 1992. Bill to override President 
Bush's veto of the bill to require companies with more 
than 50 employees to provide workers with up to 12 
weeks of unpaid leave for family emergencies.
Rejected 258-169: R 38-127; D 219-42.
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1993
1. P13 - Family and Medical Leave Rule (HR 1) . February 3, 
1993. Bill to require employers of more than 50 
employees to provide 12 weeks of unpaid leave for an 
illness or to care for a new child or sick family 
member.
Adopted 259-164: R 16-158; D 242-6; I 1-0.
2. P15 - Family and Medical Leave Optional Benefits (HR 
1). February 3, 1993. Amendment to allow employers to 
satisfy the requirements of the bill by offering family 
and medical leave as an option under a "cafeteria" plan 
that employees may choose in place of other benefits 
usually offered by the employer.
Rejected 187-244: R 157-16; D 30-227; I 0-1.
3. P16 - Family and Medical Leave/Employer Discretion (HR 
1). February 3, 1993. Amendment to strike the 
provisions that allow employers to exempt the highest- 
paid 10 percent of employees from the bill and add 
provisions to allow employers to deny employees leave 
if the leave clearly would result in substantial and 
grievous economic injury to the employer or create a 
substantial health or safety risk.
Rejected 185-238: R 156-15; D 29-222; I 0-1.
4. P17 - Family and Medical Leave/Reduced Leave (HR 1) . 
February 3, 1993. Amendment to allow an employee to 
take reduced leave, working less than eight hours a 
day, only upon agreement with the employer. The bill 
would allow an employee to take reduced leave without 
the employer's consent when medically necessary. 
Rejected 223-209: R 174-0; D 49-208; I 0-1.
5. P18- Family and Medical Leave (HR 1) . February 3, 1993. 
Adoption of the amendment to the original bill.
Adopted 269-163: R 37-137; D 231-26.
6. P19 - Family and Medical Leave/Reduced Leave (HR 1) . 
February 3, 1993. Amendment to allow an employee to 
take reduced leave, working less than eight hours a 
day, only upon agreement with the employer.
Adopted 221-204: R 174-0; D 47-203.








P20 - Family and Medical Leave/Substitute (HR 1). 
February 3, 1993. Amendment of a substitute made to the 
original bill.
Adopted 266-162: R 38-136; D 227-26; I 1-0.
P21 - Family and Medical Leave Act Motion (HR 1). 
February 3, 1993. Bill to provide 12 weeks of unpaid 
leave for family and medical reasons, with instructions 
to report it back to the House with an amendment to 
apply the provisions of the bill to the House.
Rejected 175-253: R 172-2; D 3-250, I 0-1.
P22 - Family and Medical Leave (HR 1). February 3,
1993. Bill to require employers of more than 50 
employees to provide 12 weeks of unpaid leave for an 
illness or to care for a new child or sick family 
member.
Adopted 265-163: R 40-134; D 224-29; I 1-0.
P28 - Family and Medical Leave Question (HR 1) .
February 4, 1993. Adoption of the rule to provide 
family and medical leave and agree to report the 
results of a review of the current policy regarding 
homosexuals in the military and to allow an employee to 
take reduced leave without the employer's consent when 
medically necessary.
Adopted 227-172; R 5-153; D 221-19; I 1-0.
P29 - Family and Medical Leave Rule (HR 1). February 
4, 1993. Bill to provide family and medical leave and 
agree to report the results of a review of the current 
policy regarding homosexuals in the military and to 
allow an employee to take reduced leave without the 
employer's consent when medically necessary.
Adopted 247-152: R 36-123; D 210-29; I 1-0.
P106 - Family Planning Amendment/Parental Notice (HR 
670). March 25, 1993. Amendment to federally funded 
Title X clinics to give parents 48 hours' notice before 
performing an abortion on a minor.
Rejected 179-243: R 138-34; D 41-208; I 0-1.
P218 - Injury Prevention and Control (HR 2201) . June 
14, 1993. Bill for monies to carry out programs to 
prevent and control injuries, including injuries from 
domestic violence and sexual assault.
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Adopted 305-61: R 98-57; D 206-4; I 1-0.
14. P313 - Domestic Partners (HR 2492). June 30, 1993. 
Amendment to prohibit the District of Columbia from 
using funds to enforce the domestic partners ordinance, 
which allow unmarried couples or partners to register 
with the D.C. government. Partners of city employees 
can be eligible for the group health insurance.
Adopted 251-177: R 157-14; D 94-162; I 0-1.
15. P315 - Domestic Partners (HR 2492). June 30, 1993. 
Amendment to prohibit funds from enforcing the 
District's domestic partners ordinance, which allows 
unmarried couples or partners to register with the D.C. 
government. Partners of city employees can be eligible 
for the group health insurance.
Adopted 253-167: R 158-114; D 95-152; I 0-1.
16. P334 - Federal Nutrition Programs (HR 8). July 19,
1993. Bill to reauthorize eight expiring nutrition 
programs, including the Women, Infants and Children 
program, under the National School Lunch Act and the 
Child Nutrition Act of 1966.
Adopted 372-40: R 130-39; D 241-1; I 1-0.
17. P416 - Omnibus Crime Bill (HR 3355). August 21, 1993. 
Bill to provide for community notification of violent 
sex offenders, allow prior sex offenses to be 
considered at federal trials and require HIV testing 
when requested in federal rape trials.
Adopted 235-196; R 46-131; D 188-64; I 1-0.
18. P487 - Airport Improvements/ChiId Restraints (HR 2739). 
October 7, 1993. Amendment to require airlines to 
provide child safety restraints upon request. Require 
the use of child safety restraints on airplanes.
Adopted 270-155: R 105-68; D 165-86; I 0-1.
19. P488 - Airport Improvements/Child Restraints (HR 2739) . 
October 7, 1993. Amendment to require airlines to 
provide child safety restraints upon request. Before 
this amendment, airlines would have been required to 
use the child safety restraints on airplanes.
Adopted 374-48: R 131-48; D 242-6.
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20. P491 - Airport Improvements/Child Restraints (HR 2739). 
October 13, 1993. Amendment to require airlines to 
provide child safety restraints upon request.
Adopted 375-49: R 132-41; D 242-8; I 1-0.
21. P494 - School Improvement (HR 1804) . October 13, 1993. 
Bill to authorize appropriations for model schools, 
merit schools, school choice programs and decentralized 
management programs involving parents; allow local 
communities to define "school choice" to include 
private schools; require 25 percent of federal fund to 
be spent on school choice programs by school districts ,- 
and add provisions to strengthen parental control of 
education.
Rejected 130-300: R 129-45; D 1-254; I 0-1.
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1994
1. P32 - Home Schooling (HR 6) . February 24, 1994. 
Amendment to provide that nothing in the bill shall 
permit federal control over any aspect of a private, 
religious or home school, but that this section shall 
not be construed to bar such schools from participating 
in the bill's programs.
Adopted 374-53: R 176-0; D 197-53; I 1-0.
2. P76 - Sex Education (HR 6). March 22, 1994. Amendment 
to give local school systems discretion over whether 
sex education programs should teach abstinence as the 
only method that is completely effective as protection 
against unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted 
diseases. The amendment would require schools 
receiving funds to teach abstinence as the only 
completely effective protection.
Adopted 262-166: R 53-119; D 208-47; I 1-0.
3. P294 - Community Health Centers (HR 4606) . Amendment to 
increase spending on community health centers and rural 
health outreach grants.
Adopted 224-205: R 171-2; D 53-202; I 0-1.
4. P302 - Community Health Centers (HR 4606) . Amendment to 
increase spending on community health centers and rural 
health outreach grants.
Rejected 211-217: R 173-3; D 38-213; I 0-1.
5. P321 - Domestic Partners (HR 4649) . Amendment to ban 
the use of money to implement the District of 
Columbia's domestic partners ordinance, which allows 
unmarried couples registered as domestic partners to be 
eligible for certain benefits, such as health 
insurance, accorded to married couples.
Adopted 251-176: R 160-15; D 91-160.
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Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Included in the Analysis of Family Policy Roll
Call Votes, 96th Session (1979-1980)



































































Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Included in the Analysis of Family Policy Roll
Call Votes, 97th Session (1981-1982)
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .438 .497 .000 1.000
Political Ideology .001 .294 - .626 .775
District Characteristics
Urban 66.828 34.857 .000 100.000
Rural 3 .220 3.952 .000 21.200
Blue Collar 36.259 7 . 963 7.300 59.200
White Collar 47.610 9.234 29.800 79.300
Military 13.022 3.269 5.900 40.400
Black 10.665 14.461 .000 88.900



















Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Included in the Analysis of Family Policy Roll
Call Votes, 98th Session (1983-1984)
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .374 .485 .000 1.000
Political Ideology - .024 .299 - .720 .780
District Characteristics
Urban 73 .476 22 .626 18.900 100.000
Rural 3.020 3.129 . 100 18.000
Blue Collar 31.808 7.539 10.200 66.900
White Collar 52.286 8.571 35.600 79.000
Military 13.031 2 .438 3.800 30.000
Women in the Labor Force 49.884 5.565 19.400 64.600
Households with Kids under 18 51.570 4.813 31.100 67.000
Married Couple Households 10.542 10.344 1.900 52.000
Female Headed Households 10.352 3.713 4.900 34.900
White 88.827 17.315 1.600 99.200
Black 11.739 15.398 .100 90.400
Hispanic 6.318 10.724 71.700 .300


















Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Included in the Analysis of Family Policy Roll
Call Votes, 99th Session (1985-1986)
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .405 .492 .000 1.000
Political Ideology - .002 .316 - .850 .690
District Characteristics
Urban 73.763 22.534 18.900 100.000
Rural 2.965 3.104 . 100 18.000
Blue Collar 31.024 7.530 66.900 10.200
White Collar 52 .444 8.564 35.600 79.000
Military 13.024 2.436 3.800 30.000
Women in the Labor Force 49.913 5.562 19.400 64.600
Households with Kids under 18 51.582 4.826 31.100 67.000
Married Couple Households 10.647 10.492 1.900 52.000
Female Headed Households 10.365 3.768 4.900 34.900
White 82.819 17.544 1.600 99.200
Black 11.675 15.652 .100 92.100
Hispanic 6.405 10.775 .300 71.700


















Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Included in the Analysis of Family Policy Roll
Call Votes, 100th Session (1987-1988)



















Women in the Labor Force












































































Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Included in the Analysis of Family Policy Roll
Call Votes, 101st Session (1989-1990)
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .403 .491 .000 1.000
Political Ideology - .219 .432 - .981 .980
District Characteristics
Urban 73.548 22.652 18.900 100.000
Rural 2.972 3.075 .100 18.000
Blue Collar 31.686 7.547 10.200 66.900
White Collar 52.469 8.590 35.600 79.000
Military 12.987 2 . 510 .700 30.000
Women in the Labor Force 48.885 5. 589 19.400 64.600
Households with Kids under 18 51.552 4.838 31.100 67.000
Married Couple Households 10.583 10.338 1.900 52.000
Female Headed Households 10.357 3.781 4.900 34.900
White 82.829 17.568 1.600 99.200
Black 11.741 15.764 .100 92.100
Hispanic 6.280 10.702 .300 71.700


















Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Included in the Analysis of Family Policy Roll
Call Votes, 102nd Session (1991-1992)
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .379 .491 .000 2 . 000
Political Ideology .091 .465 - 1.000 1.000
District Characteristics
Urban 73 .560 22.505 18.900 100.000
Rural 2.989 3 .118 .100 18.000
Blue Collar 31.769 7.515 10.200 66.900
White Collar 52.397 8.538 35.600 79.000
Military 12.959 2 .489 .700 30.000
Women in the Labor Force 49.914 5.573 19.400 64 .600
Households with Kids under 18 51.607 4 .787 31.100 67.000
Married Couple Households 10.627 10 .494 1. 900 52.000
Female Headed Households 10.295 3 .675 4.900 34.900
White 83.153 17.236 1.600 99.200
Black 11.471 15.287 .100 92.100
Hispanic 6.245 10.614 .300 71.700


















Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Included in the Analysis of Family Policy Roll
Call Votes, 103rd Session (1993-1994)
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .400 .495 .000 2.000
Political Ideology - .118 .475 - .960 1.000
District Characteristics
Urban 74 .448 21.832 13.100 100.000
Rural 2.529 2.529 .200 2.414
Blue Collar 27.432 8.745 8.500 74.200
White Collar 57.445 9.107 31.500 82.700
Military 13 .416 2.981 1.100 27.600
Women in the Labor Force 56.795 5.874 16.000 73.400
Households with Kids under 18 26.517 5.180 10.000 41.000
Married Couple Households 56.390 8.164 26.000 70.000
Female Headed Households 16.753 6.954 8.300 52.500
White 79.865 19.804 1.200 98.700
Black 12.192 16.373 .200 74 .000
Hispanic 8.859 14.303 .300 83.700
Median Age 32.923 3.047 3.300 47.600
Huioo
APPENDIX C
RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS
159
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
160
Results of Principal Components Analysis of Family Policy
Roll Call Votes, 96th Congress (1979 - 1980)
Title Bill Factor
P559 Welfare Reform HR 4904 .864
P560 Welfare Reform HR 4904 .852
P566 Welfare Reform HR 4904 -.857
P567 Welfare Reform HR 4904 .827
P631 Child Health HR 4962 - .818
P635 Child Health HR 4962 - .754
P643 Domestic Violence HR 2977 .654
P201 Food Stamps S 1309 - .733
P204 Food Stamps S 1309 -.716
P406 Housing and Community Dev. HR 7262 .373
P547 Domestic Violence HR 2977 .633
Eigenvalue = 6.147
Proportion of Variance Explained = 55.9
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Results of Principal Components Analysis of Family Policy
Roll Call Votes, 97th Congress (1981 - 1982)
Title______________________________ Bill___________ Factor
P260 Food and Agriculture Act HR 3603 -.880
Pll Federal Flexible and Compressed
Work Schedules HR 5366 .880
Eigenvalue = 1.55
Proportion of Variance Explained = 77.4
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Results of Principal Components Analysis of Family Policy
Roll Call Votes, 98th Congress (1983 - 1984)
Title Bill Factor
P4 Select Committee on Children HR 4091 .605
P125 Meals for Older Americans HR 16 .517
P164 Follow Through Amendment HR 2807 .808
P298 Unemployment Health Insurance HR 2148 .693
P300 Unemployment Health Insurance HR 3021 .731
P316 Rehabilitation Act HR 3021 .751
P387 School Lunch HR 3520 .854
P13 Child Abuse Amendments HR 1904 .436
P14 Child Abuse Amendments HR 1904 .497
P66 Child Nutrition HR 5600 .823
P70 Child Nutrition HR 5151 - .824
P93 Child Nutrition HR 648 - .810
P94 Child Nutrition HR 5538 .766
P196 Human Services Amendments HR 7 .799
P201 Family Planning Block Grant HR 7 .659
P305 Hunger Relief HR 7 .564
P369 Continuing Appropriating HR 7 .436
P376 Preventive Health Care HR 5538 .432
Eigenvalue = 8.40
Proportion of Variance Explained = 46.7
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Results of Principal Components Analysis of Family Policy
Roll Call Votes, 99th Congress (1985 - 1986)
Title Bill Factor
P147 Family Planning Assistance HR 2369 .656
P274 School Lunch & Nutrition HR 7 .816
P280 School Lunch & Nutrition HR 7 - .841
P281 School Lunch & Nutrition HR 7 -.859
P282 School Lunch & Nutrition HR 7 -.875
P283 School Lunch & Nutrition HR 7 .694
P22 Health Services Amendment HR 2418 .842
P33 Health Services Amendment HR 2418 - .781
P94 Community Services Programs HR 4421 .557
Eigenvalue = 5.42
Proportion of Variance Explained = 60.2
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Results of Principal Components Analysis of Family Policy
Roll Call Votes, 100th Congress (1987 - 1988)
Title Bill Factor
P154 Older Americans Act HR 1451 .776
P172 Housing & Community Dev. HR 4 .857
P430 Older Americans Act HR 1451 .857
P485 Welfare Reform HR 1720 -.536
P486 Welfare Reform HR 1720 -.902
P487 Welfare Reform HR 1720 .891
P114 Overseas Teachers Act HR 3424 .653
P172 Children's Television Prog. HR 3966 .614
P176 Long-Term Home Care HR 3436 .581
P201 Fair Housing HR 1158 -.645
P214 Fair Housing HR 1158 -.577
P338 AIDS Federal Policy HR 5142 -.695
P373 Welfare Reform HR 1720 .011
Eigenvalue = 6.34
Proportion of Variance Explained = 48.8
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Results of Principal Components Analysis of Family Policy
Roll Call Votes, 101st Congress (1989 - 1990)
Title Bill Factor
P203 Health and Human Services HR 2990 .512
P54 Child Care HR 3 .819
P55 Child Care HR 3 .688
P57 Child Care HR 3 -.876
P58 Child Care HR 3 .876
P59 Child Care HR 3 - .875
P60 Child Care HR 3 .817
P104 Parental & Medical Leave Act HR 770 .832
P105 Parental & Medical Leave Act HR 770 .851
P106 Parental & Medical Leave Act HR 770 - .880
P107 Parental & Medical Leave Act HR 770 .848
P262 Family & Medical Leave Act HR 770 .859
Eigenvalue = 8.02
Proportion of Variance Explained = 66.9
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Results of Principal Components Analysis of Family Policy
Roll Call Votes, 102nd Congress (1991 - 1992)
Title Bill Factor
P226 National Adolescent Survey HR 2507 .770
P347 Head Start HR 3543 .779
P382 Healthy Start Program HR 2707 .790
P389 Family & Medical Leave Act HR 2 .839
P391 Family & Medical Leave Act HR 2 .835
P390 Family & Medical Leave Act HR 2 -.751
P392 Family & Medical Leave Act HR 2 -.765
P393 Family & Medical Leave Act HR 2 .877
P370 Child Nutrition Programs HR 3603 .832
P371 Child Nutrition Programs HR 3603 -.847
P372 Child Nutrition Programs HR 3603 .830
P379 Agriculture Appropriations HR 5487 .414
P385 Neighborhood Schools Improv. HR 4323 .820
P389 Family Leave S 5 .600
P390 Family Leave S 5 .867
P420 Domestic Partnership HR 5517 -.668
P430 Family and Medical Leave Act S 5 .832
P443 Family and Medical Leave Act S 5 .879
Eigenvalue = 11.11
Proportion of Variance Explained = 61.7
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Results of Principal Components Analysis of Family Policy
Roll Call Votes, 103rd Congress (1993 - 1994)
Title Bill Factor
P13 Family and Medical Leave HR 1 -.791
P15 Family and Medical Leave HR 1 .901
P16 Family and Medical Leave HR 1 .888
P17 Family and Medical Leave HR 1 .876
P18 Family and Medical Leave HR 1 -.819
P19 Family and Medical Leave HR 1 .843
P20 Family and Medical Leave HR 1 - .886
P21 Family and Medical Leave HR 1 .857
P22 Family and Medical Leave HR 1 -.815
P28 Family and Medical Leave HR 1 -.871
P29 Family and Medical Leave HR 1 -.858
P106 Family Planning Amendment HR 670 .747
P218 Injury Prevention and Control HR 2201 -.464
P313 Domestic Partners HR 2492 .747
P315 Domestic Partners HR 2492 .735
P334 Federal Nutrition Programs HR 8 - .388
P416 Omnibus Crime Bill HR 3355 -.642
P487 Airport Improvements HR 2739 .018
P488 Airport Improvements HR 2739 -.419
P491 Airport Improvements HR 2739 -.423
P494 School Improvement HR 1804 .782
P32 Home Schooling HR 6 .413
P76 Sex Education HR 6 .697
P294 Community Health Centers HR 4606 .845
P302 Community Health Centers HR 4606 .868
P321 Domestic Partners HR 4649 .722
Eigenvalue = 14.07
Proportion of Variance Explained = 54 .1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Proportion Predicted Correctly 
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Proportion Predicted Correctly 
x2
Pseudo R2
Proportion Reduction in Error 

















































































Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for the Roll Call Votes during 96th Session.
P406 P547
_________________________________________ b________________t________________b________________ t_______
Intercept - 4.875 - 2 .364" .669 .273
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .014 .035 2.056 4 .091*"
Political Ideology - 2.269 - 3.105*** - 9.514 - 7.890***
District Characteristics______________
Urban .014 3.245*** .012 2.492**
Blue Collar - .012 - .692 - .008 - .376




Female head o f Household
Black .008 .800 • .021 - 1.400
Hispanic
Median Age .079 1.820* - .023 - .499
Proportion Predicted Correctly 72.830 82.750
x1 59.692 181.535
Pseudo R1 .217 .539
Proportion Reduction in Error .120 .480




































Proportion Predicted Correctly 
x1
Pseudo R1
Proportion Reduction in Error 












































































Proportion Predicted Correctly 
x1
Pseudo R1
Proportion Reduction in Error 






















































































































Intercept .130 .014 - 13.364 1.401 6.704 .458
Personal Characteristics
Political Party 2.720 - 4.898*** .821 1.461 .758 .957
Political Ideology 6.098 - 5.448*** - 11.036 - 7.538*** - 17.649 - 5.692*
District Characteristics
Urban .007 .539 .016 1.298 .009 .499
Blue Collar .042 1.285 .038 1.242 .032 .811
Military .084 .877 .250 2.825*** .145 .958
Worn Lab Force .023 .490 .038 .843 .070 - 1.003
Famw/Children<18 .018 .196 .117 1.359 .043 .337
Married Couples .009 .455 .019 - 1.030 .002 .091
Female head o f Household .012 .085 .092 .661 .081 .328
Black .001 .020 .057 - 2.119** .320 .687
Hispanic .018 .892 .038 - 1.841* .008 .168
Median Age .064 .397 .140 .948 .006 .028
Proportion Predicted Correctly 91.160 86.000 92.110
x’ 335.223 305.399 243.143
Pseudo R2 .763 .722 .761
Proportion Reduction in Error .810 .650 .580



























Intercept - 10.609 .725 11.654 1.660* 6.684 .442
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .633 .900 .289 .642 2.389 2.967***
Political Ideology - 19.428 - 6.746*** - 4.489 - 5.124*** - 13.831 - 5.525***
District Characteristics
Urban .007 .330 .022 - 2.399** .009 .415
Blue Collar .049 1.022 .048 - 2.057** .050 .818
Military .287 1.986** .171 - 2.622*** .127 .910
Worn Lab Force .015 .209 .059 1.825* .063 .834
Fam w/Children <18 .061 .466 .117 - 1.853* .011 .079
Married Couples .022 1.009 .006 .500 .003 .127
Female head o f Household .489 2.134** .074 .913 .085 .454
Black .159 - 3.234*** .025 1.528 .003 .101
Hispanic .015 .366 .055 3.339*** .008 .196
Median Age .169 .784 .164 1.477 .055 .251
Proportion Predicted Correctly 93.090 95.950 94.920
X1 331.655 145.385 101.521
Pseudo R2 .832 .412 .565
Proportion Reduction in Error .740 .470 .370



















Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for the Roll Call Votes during 98th Session.
P66 P70 P93















Proportion Predicted Correctly 
xl
Pseudo R2
Proportion Reduction in Error 
* Significant <.10 **  Significant < .05
1.398 - 1.661* .666
22.589 - 6.052*** 13.512
.026 - 1.119 .022
.014 - .322 - .059
.073 .352 .100
.057 .589 - .009
.170 - .967 - .017
.002 .091 - .015
.108 - .390 - .013
.003 .047 - .019
.106 2.063** - .002





* **  Significant < .01
1.107 - 1.623 - 2.094**
6.456*** 18.928 6.943***
1.26 .002 .105
- 1.636 .041 - .922
.753 .115 - .889
.149 .066 .982
.143 - .152 - 1.218
.663 - .027 - 1.106
.070 - .382 - 1.907*
.517 .093 2.380**
.053 .020 .456







































Proportion Predicted Correctly 
x2
Pseudo R 2
Proportion Reduction in Error 

















***  Significant < .01
.337 - 11.460 - 1.124
.934 1.120 2.082**
6.546*** - 8.660 - 6.751***































































Intercept 16.485 .917 - 19.515 - 1.474 - 98.933 - 2.277**
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .342 .261 2.615 3.816*** 3.476 1.933*
Political ideology - 22.976 - 5.106*** - 8.399 - 5.642*** - 25.417 - 3.463**<
District Characteristics
Urban - .047 - 1.805* 0.00 .024 .074 1.583
Blue Collar • .46 .781 .027 .590 .145 1.032
Military .108 .702 .038 .329 .001 0.00
Worn Lab Force - .018 .212 .059 - 1.012 .180 - 1.232
Famw/Children<18 - .015 .098 .218 1.852* 1.034 2.354**
Married Couples .015 .473 .017 .865 .020 .500
Female head of Household - .566 - 1.405 .070 .352 .179 .559
Black .128 1.569 .051 1.267 .006 .124
Hispanic .089 1.442 .091 1.919* .056 .645
Median Age .027 .109 .353 1.753* 1.752 2.438**
Proportion Predicted Correctly 94.950 92.370 98.900
xJ 155.657 17.890 95.969
Pseudo R2 .724 .393 .765
Proportion Reduction in Error .500 .240 .730



































Proportion Predicted Correctly 
xl
Pseudo Rl
Proportion Reduction in Error 























































































































Intercept .634 .042 17.749 1.155 .752 .111
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .306 .452 1.681 - 2.035** .684 .688
Political Ideology 14.836 7.159*** 20.543 6.748*** - 21.594 - 5.816**'
District Characteristics
Urban .036 1.848* .060 2.673*** .047 - 1.949*
Blue Collar .032 .706 .079 1.515 .021 .361
Military .072 .555 .407 - 2.558** .256 1.550
Worn Lab Force .031 .452 .070 .963 .176 2.318**
Fam w/Children <18 .061 .444 .281 - 2.037** .154 • 1.121
Married Couples .023 1.124 .020 .834 .017 .718
Female head o f Household .104 .568 .225 1.215 .381 1.830*
Black .005 .147 .053 - 1.667* .024 .785
Hispanic .057 - 1.218 .034 .774 .020 .461
Median Age .104 .462 .407 1.822* .038 .162
Proportion Predicted Correctly 93.320 92.770 94.030
X1 400.466 382.053 220.667
Pseudo RJ .849 .848 .757
Proportion Reduction in Error .830 .790 .570


















Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for the Roll Call Votes during 99th Session.
P22 P33 P94
 b________________t________________b________________ t________________b________________t








Worn Lab Force 
Fam w/Children <18 
Married Couples 




Proportion Predicted Correctly 
xl
Pseudo R1
Proportion Reduction in Error 
* Significant <.10 **  Significant < .05
.998 1.371 .121
14.908 - 6.953*** 15.498




.101 .812 - .079
.029 - 1.258 .006
.062 .297 - .502
.004 .079 .060
.031 .675 - .012





* **  Significant < ,01
.166 - 1.610 - 1.249
6.302*** - 16.686 - 5.079***




.652 - .098 • .628
.298 .005 .206
- 2.444** - .154 - .530
1.506 ,078 1.230
.294 .022 .420








































Proportion Predicted Correctly 
xJ
Pseudo RJ
Proportion Reduction in Error 






















































































































Intercept 5.755 .615 - 28.627 .899 - 7.733 .556
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .343 .433 5.294 3.609*** .230 .326
Political Ideology 7.039 5.463*** 14.871 2.762*** - 14.389 - 6.508***
District Characteristics
Urban .013 .980 .009 .192 .007 .385
Blue Collar .040 1.264 .005 .066 .011 .273
Military .146 1.417 .234 .728 .180 - 1.172
Worn Lab Force .011 .252 .124 .609 .004 .057
Famw/Children<l8 .097 1.217 .210 .860 .006 .050
Married Couples .019 .935 .016 .445 .013 .533
Female head o f Household .457 - 3.142*** .303 .652 .400 1.676*
Black .063 2.209** .023 .291 .032 .846
Hispanic .013 .785 .019 .147 .103 2.050**
Median Age .126 .832 .215 .465 .201 .917
Proportion Predicted Correctly 88.580 98.990 94.950
xJ 174.848 500.444 425.885
Pseudo R2 .562 .967 .880
Proportion Reduction in Error .460 .980 .890


























Intercept 1.507 .204 - 7.621 .721 - 10.953 - 1.691
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .767 1.507 .804 1.213 .247 .531
Political Ideology 7.072 - 6.978*** - 8.117 - 6.101*** - 3.789 4.784***
District Characteristics
Urban .006 .525 .016 1.068 .013 - 1.383
Blue Collar .031 - 1.167 .034 .917 .014 .657
Military .019 .261 .170 - 1.767* .028 .449
Worn Lab Force .022 .616 .019 .418 .034 1.074
Fam w/Children <18 .006 .087 .103 1.048 .018 .313
Married Couples .002 .147 .017 1.008 .002 .131
Female head o f Household .074 .718 .005 .037 .020 .276
Black .018 .913 .022 1.041 .020 1.320
Hispanic .006 .441 .050 1.443 .032 2.398**
Median Age .051 .426 .168 1.047 .279 2.674***
Proportion Predicted Correctly 79.850 87.140 73.970
x2 198.765 154.269 135.099
Pseudo R2 .542 .534 .396
Proportion Reduction in Error .460 .320 .370



























Intercept 4.910 .552 2.732 .377 - 12.290 - 1.029
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .384 .738 .485 - 1.034 .845 1.272
Political Ideology 6.998 6.548*** 5.880 6.487*** 7.770 5.932*
District Characteristics
Urban .003 .270 .015 1.472 .009 .600
Blue Collar .016 .577 .056 2.140** .008 .250
Military .036 .450 .135 1.962** .156 - 1.366
Worn Lab Force .060 1.440 .067 1.895* .027 .516
Fam w/Childrcn <18 .089 1.069 .005 .085 .054 .527
Married Couples .011 .727 .005 .330 .013 .817
Female head o f Household .096 .803 .046 .540 .171 1.122
Black .010 .455 .025 1.450 .011 .373
Hispanic .009 .408 .023 - 1.519 .018 .576
Median Age .018 .130 .064 .559 .287 1.533
Proportion Predicted Correctly 82.150 77.720 86.360
xJ 191.098 177.691 214.961
Pseudo R1 .564 .508 .652
Proportion Reduction in Error .380 .440 .430



































Proportion Predicted Correctly 
x*
Pseudo Rl
Proportion Reduction in Error 

















































































Proportion Reduction in Error 


















































































































Proportion Predicted Correctly 
xl
Pseudo R1
Proportion Reduction in Error 
































































































































Proportion Predicted Correctly 
x*
Pseudo R1
Proportion Reduction in Error 























































































































Intercept 21.434 1.915* - 21.052 - 2.121** - 25.803 - 2.468**
Personal Characteristics
Political Party - 1.785 - 2.211** 4.723 5.280*** 4.613 5.109***
Political Ideology 10.801 6.530*** - 13.772 - 7.846*** - 13.972 - 7.720***
District Characteristics
Urban - .041 - 2.723*** .019 1.425 .031 2.206**
Blue Collar - .052 - 1.500 .026 .855 .042 1.266
Military - .152 - 1.527 .014 .167 .038 .435
Worn Lab Force .035 .718 .051 - 1.154 .073 - 1.592
Fam w/Children<18 - .176 - 1.627 .153 1.581 .205 2.011**
Married Couples .027 1.478 .037 - 2.191** .040 - 2.248**
Female head o f Household .001 .010 .167 - 1.223 .099 .712
Black .023 .720 .019 .759 .005 .185
Hispanic - .011 .352 .053 1.867* .038 1.342
Median Age - .219 - 1.377 .352 2.417*** .388 2.577**
Proportion Predicted Corrcctly 90.130 89.670 89.800
X1 333.556 336.569 352.475
Pseudo RJ .778 .765 .781
Proportion Reduction in Error .730 .770 .770


























Intercept 8.837 .950 - 9.603 - 1.056 - 2.906 .282
Personal Characteristics
Political Party 1.087 1.575 1.953 2.600*** 3.230 3.595**'
Political Ideology 6.760 - 6.548*** - 7.828 - 6.944*** - 10.959 - 7.013**'
District Characteristics
Urban .011 .887 .014 - 1.165 .009 .716
Blue Collar .027 .922 .056 - 1.710* .018 .571
Military .041 .465 .137 1.707* .144 - 1.526
Worn Lab Force .039 .820 .013 .331 .110 - 2.103**
Famw/Children<l8 .023 .266 .088 1.007 .089 .911
Married Couples .029 1.805* .027 - 1.852* .024 1.457
Female head o f Household .047 .400 .102 .815 .133 1.011
Black .012 .560 .019 .834 .038 1.531
Hispanic .019 .845 .012 .610 .017 .641
Median Age .174 1.268 .184 1.352 .120 .784
Proportion Predicted Correctly 87.110 85.500 90.360
x2 257.237 272.154 324.950
Pseudo R2 .669 .672 .758
Proportion Reduction in Error .490 .650 .760



























Intercept 6.215 .271 15.807 1.441 - 12.412 - 1.190
Personal Characteristics
Political Party 1.273 .876 - 1.604 - 2.294** 2.269 2.917**
Political Ideology - 15.599 - 4.437*** 6.579 6.409*** - 8.376 - 4.107***
District Characteristics
Urban .009 .410 .002 .151 .008 .670
Blue Collar .037 .787 .022 .754 .023 .768
Military - .030 .124 .081 .926 .116 1.345
Worn Lab Force - .152 1.315 .078 1.832* .024 .544
Fam w/Children <18 - .018 .094 .063 .630 .090 .906
Married Couples - .048 - 1.524 .022 • 1.360 .018 - 1.152
Female head o f Household - .190 .664 .221 - 1.636 .175 1.278
Black .078 1.399 .046 1.820* .035 - 1.354
Hispanic .029 .377 0.00 .020 .001 .044
Median Age .096 .274 .218 - 1.238 .216 1.388
Proportion Predicted Correctly 97.510 86.030 87.280
X1 403.795 212.128 275.303
Pseudo R2 .926 .617 .690
Proportion Reduction in Error .930 .560 .610


























Intercept 20.063 1.777* - 19.908 - 1.806* - 6.995 .423
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .014 .022 3.786 4.143*** 1.726 1.315
Political Ideology 5.086 5.934*** - 11.002 - 7.312*** - 14.599 - 5.737**
District Characteristics
Urban - .019 - 1.421 .004 .312 .007 .401
Blue Collar - .041 - 1.218 .018 .571 .089 1.833*
Military - .101 - 1,130 .077 .876 .324 1.698*
Worn Lab Force .025 .563 .007 .157 .093 1.531
Fam w/Children <18 - .121 1.266 .132 1.233 .037 .267
Married Couples .009 .597 .014 .855 .021 .859
Female head o f Household .086 .704 .143 1.030 .109 .530
Black - .014 .696 .042 - 1.673* .004 .105
Hispanic - .052 - 1.671* .033 1.070 .012 .445
Median Age - .439 - 2.531** .321 1.974** .157 .603
Proportion Predicted Correctly 87.310 89.750 94.070
xJ 226.673 326.161 415.122
Pseudo R1 .624 .752 .877
Proportion Reduction in Error .390 .750 .880


























Intercept 21.103 1.301 - 7.109 .567 7.853 1.033
Personal Characteristics
Political Party - .243 .172 1.036 1.156 .570 .986
Political Ideology 14.538 5.405*** - 10.350 - 6.415*** - 3.318 - 4.795**«
District Characteristics
Urban - .002 .100 .042 - 2.508** .021 - 1.746*
Blue Collar - .073 - 1.472 .049 - 1.089 .351 1.340
Military - .049 .315 .122 1.096 .041 .499
Worn Lab Force - .089 - 1.272 .006 .100 .051 - 1.287
Famw/Children<l8 - .061 .423 .082 .682 .009 .132
Married Couples - .041 - 1.363 .001 .059 .005 .350
Female head o f Household .195 .863 .182 • 1.251 .110 .868
Black - .005 .100 .045 1.688* .086 2.767**
Hispanic - .028 .832 .069 1.999* .045 1.845*
Median Age - .328 ■ 1.240 .317 1.777* .093 .820
Proportion Predicted Correctly 94.900 93.610 80.970
x1 437.991 368.235 126.713
Pseudo R1 .899 .827 .421
Proportion Reduction in Error .890 .840 .270





























Worn Lab Force 
Famw/Children<18 
Married Couples 




Proportion Predicted Correctly 
x’
Pseudo R*
Proportion Reduction in Error 
* Significant <.10 **  Significant < .05
13.900 - .863 - 15.551
1.118 - 1.443 - .967
10.633 - .5912*** - 7.829
.002 .088 - .020
.020 - .336 - .018
.158 .934 - .039
.003 .042 .088
.074 .511 .140
.046 1.908* - .010
.280 1.277 .055
.024 - .625 - .045






***  Significant < .01
1.264 - 26.241 - 2.303**
1.078 3.801 4.017***
5.716*** - 11.133 - 7.084***
1.173 0.00 .028
.529 - .015 - .472
.379 .034 .375
1.437 - .001 - .014
1.183 .186 1.702*
.546 - .004 - .218
.329 .128 .896













































* * *  Significant < .01
30.106 - 1.650* - 24.850 - 2.133**
.707 - .697 3.789 4.002***
12.594 - 5.313*** - 11.605 - 7.175***
.015 - .610 0.00 .014
.021 .410 - .027 - .835
.197 1.182 - .030 - .317
.126 1.371 .014 .292
.153 .871 .169 1.496
.015 .555 - .002 - .144
.360 1.381 .114 .797
.090 - 1.725* - .026 - .983
.018 .379 .039 1.207












Worn Lab Force 
Famw/Children<18 
Married Couples 




Proportion Predicted Correctly 
x2
Pseudo R2
Proportion Reduction in Error 


























Intercept - 7.085 - 1.104 13.033 1.474 4.495 .558
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .714 - 1.350 1.653 1.800* .586 .739
Political Ideology - 5.651 - 6.578*** 11.043 6.553*** 9.606 6.498***
District Characteristics
Urban .001 .093 .014 .889 .030 - 1.974**
Blue Collar .029 .933 .064 1.404 .018 .490
Military .062 .667 .002 .014 .117 1.126
Worn Lab Force .012 .297 .015 .272 .056 1.267
Fam w/Children <18 .035 .352 .170 1.360 .038 .281
Married Couples .058 .684 .187 - 1.633 .056 .473
Female head o f Household .099 .889 .200 - 1.318 .234 - 1.619
Black .005 .158 .034 .892 .086 2.291**
Hispanic .002 .105 .006 .306 .012 .520
Median Age .077 1.191 .083 - 1.119 .059 .655
Proportion Predicted Correctly 91.630 91.900 92.250
xJ 342.297 410.339 404.811
Pseudo R2 .758 .835 .837
Proportion Reduction in Error .790 .820 .820




































Proportion Predicted Correctly 
x2
Pseudo R2
Proportion Reduction in Error 

















- 15.581 • 2.507**
.237 .455



































































Proportion Predicted Correctly 
x*
Pseudo Rl
Proportion Reduction in Error 
* Significant < .10 ♦♦ Significant < .05
P20 P21 P22
_b_______________ t________________ b_______________ t________________ b________________ t_______
16.189 - 1.983** - 10.582 - .567 - 13.693 - 2.123**
1.757 2.359** 2.367 2.320*** 1.037 1.852*
9.395 - 7.116*** 13.514 4.973*** - 6.053 - 7.086***
.022 1.771* - .034 - 1.095 .017 1.639
.021 - .819 .008 .139 - .015 - .722
.062 .636 .068 .362 .061 .820
.068 1.363 .156 1.936* .060 1.494
.011 - .098 .210 .451 .055 .629
.047 .461 .005 .017 .020 .252
.370 2.736*** .106 .461 .236 2.243**
.136 - 3.766*** - .032 - .464 - .095 - 3.341***
.013 - .625 .028 .381 - .008 - .470

































Intercept 7.305 .351 - 15.239 - 1.822* - 19.489 - 2.315**
Personal Characteristics
Political Party 2.130 1.452 2.025 2.616*** - 2.056 - 2.958**'
Political Ideology - 18.141 - 5.137*** - 9.538 - 7.003*** 7.798 7.071**'
District Characteristics
Urban .006 .222 .012 .876 .005 .502
Blue Collar - .070 .877 .034 1.001 .007 .308
Military - .040 .224 .026 .252 .147 1.878*
Worn Lab Force .003 .110 .048 .968 .038 .913
Fam w/Children<18 - .057 .160 .015 .129 .179 1.799*
Married Couples .087 .337 .071 .680 .089 1.057
Female head o f Household - .029 .110 .394 2.790*** .214 2.194**
Black - .056 .839 .142 - 3.765*** .025 .979
Hispanic - .025 .580 .039 - 2.099** .008 .539
Median Age - .291 .721 .086 1.048 .223 1.995**
Proportion Predicted Correctly 95.430 91.410 86.300
X2 460.131 332.313 298.023
Pseudo R2 .925 .772 .688
Proportion Reduction in Error .890 .770 .670



































Proportion Predicted Correctly 
xl
Pseudo R1
Proportion Reduction in Error 
* Significant < . 10 *♦ Significant < .05
P218 P313 P315
_b________________t________________b________________ t________________b________________t______
14.823 1.659* 5.098 .638 4.463 .519
1.608 2.307** - 3.903 - 4.432*** - 3.677 - 4.214***
8.295 - 6.690*** 10.278 7.580*** 9.747 7.390***
.017 - 1.373 .002 .166 .002 .136
.004 - .158 .099 3.324*** .094 3.134***
.281 - 2.806*** .006 .069 .004 .045
.018 .470 - .034 - .682 - .064 - 1.270
.168 - 1.577 .150 1.123 .172 1.172
.002 0.00 .119 - 1.179 .115 - 1.072
.005 .038 - .163 - 1.372 - .133 - 1.115
.007 - .189 .043 1.383 .039 1.249
.025 .928 - .004 - .217 • .010 - .615










































Proportion Predicted Correctly 
x1
Pseudo RJ
Proportion Reduction in Error 






















































































































Intercept .662 .077 .591 .071 - 2.037 .157
Personal Characteristics
Political Party .362 .583 .749 1.236 .227 .255
Political Ideology 4.667 - 5.213*** - 4.684 - 2.309*** 15.608 6.340*"
District Characteristics
Urban .021 1.749* .024 2.024** .002 .120
Blue Collar .005 .230 .004 .171 .026 .758
Military .021 .220 .036 .390 .129 .968
Worn Lab Force .013 .317 .022 .555 .015 .227
Fam w/Children <18 .055 .608 .040 .456 .370 - 1.797*
Married Couples .058 .646 .044 .491 .253 1.607
Female head o f Household .026 .197 .003 .024 .094 .492
Black .026 .652 .006 .173 .120 2.095**
Hispanic .020 .975 .023 - 1.161 .092 2.097**
Median Age .004 .039 .019 .177 .185 - 1.005
Proportion Predicted Conectly 90.780 90.360 93.790
x2 92.671 86.721 406.267
Pseudo R2 .396 .369 .877
Proportion Reduction in Error .160 .200 .800


























Intercept 13.828 1.458 - 3.565 .588 4.063 .449
Personal Characteristics
Political Party 2.170 .172 2.481 3.881*** .584 .605
Political Ideology 15.340 6.142*** - 7.144 - 7.469*** 12.326 6.747***
District Characteristics
Urban .050 - 2.429** .010 1.071 .059 - 3.250***
Blue Collar .021 .427 .033 1.583 .017 .468
Military .073 .783 .028 .402 .041 .378
Worn Lab Force .098 1.374 .021 .603 .096 1.636
Fam w/Children <18 .029 .154 .079 .850 .231 1.424
Married Couples .079 .672 .052 .708 .126 .911
Female head o f Household .007 .062 .017 .189 .093 .598
Black .006 .229 .020 .853 .037 .925
Hispanic .051 1.865 .020 1.212 .031 1.206
Median Age .029 .203 .023 .325 .022 .256
Proportion Predicted Correctly 93.790 83.890 95.000
x2 188.195 235.858 444.266
Pseudo R2 .692 .587 .871
Proportion Reduction in Error .480 .590 .890



















Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for the Roll Call Votes during 103rd Session.
P302 P321
b________________t________________b________________t
Intercept 4.275 .382 12.793 1.602
Personal Characteristics
Political Party 1.231 1.185 - 3.663 - 4.411***
Political Ideology 13.251 6.324*** 9.413 7.426***
District Characteristics
Urban .049 - 2.765*** .014 - 1.131
Blue Collar .027 .869 .083 3.045***
Military .018 .154 .185 - 2.254**
Worn Lab Force .061 .948 .092 - 1.853*
Fam w/Children <18 .204 1.011 .279 2.461**
Married Couples .121 .756 .225 - 2.676***
Female head o f Household .083 .522 .087 .814
Black .077 1.893* .009 .298
Hispanic .040 1.562 .015 .968
Median Age .007 .046 .116 .961
Proportion Predicted Correctly 94.520 87.860
X1 452.938 317.656
Pseudo R2 .880 .725
Proportion Reduction in Error .890 .700
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